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Abstract
Building on rational choice institutionalism theory and Williamson’s (J Econ Lit
38(3): 595–613, 2000) four-level social analysis framework, we investigate the
influence of the informal institution of social trust on debt contract design in an
international setting. Using a sample of non-U.S. firms that issue bonds in the
U.S. debt market, we find that Yankee bond creditors impose fewer covenants
on bond issuers domiciled in countries with a high degree of social trust. We
further show that the inverse relationship between debt covenants and the
informal institution of social trust is more pronounced for firms from countries
with weak formal institutions, as well as for firms with poor corporate
governance and greater information opacity. These findings are robust to
endogeneity tests, within-country analysis, various empirical models and
measures of trust, and alternative hypotheses. We also show that, while a
lower level of informal social trust is associated with higher borrowing costs, this
relationship weakens when formal covenants are added to the debt contract
(i.e., a substitution effect). Our paper contributes to the international business
literature by providing new insights into the role of informal institutions (social
trust) in cross-border debt contracting.
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INTRODUCTION
Arrow’s (1972: 357) insight that ‘‘virtually every commercial
transaction has within itself an element of trust’’ has generated a
large and growing body of related research. Recent empirical
studies have examined how the informal institution of social trust
affects financial and economic transactions. The evidence to date
finds significant links between social trust and international merger
and acquisition activities (Ahern, Daminelli, & Fracassi, 2015;
Stahl, Chua, & Pablo, 2012), venture capital investments and
outcomes (Bottazzi, Da Rin, & Hellmann, 2016), stock market
participation and ownership structure (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales,
2008), bilateral trade in goods, financial assets, and foreign direct
investment (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2009), loan spreads
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(Hasan, Hoi, Wu, & Zhang, 2017), cost of debt
(Meng & Yin, 2019), bank risk-taking (Kanagaretnam, Lobo, Wang, & Whalen, 2019), corporate
cash holdings (Dudley & Zhang, 2016), and international IPO underpricing (Li, Wang, & Wang,
2019). In addition to financial transactions, social
trust has been shown to play an important role in
international
management,
marketing,
entrepreneurship, and open innovation. Previous
studies find a significant causal link between social
trust and participants in international joint ventures (Ertug, Cuypers, Noorderhaven, & Benasou,
2013; Madhok, 2006; Ng, Lau, & Nyaw, 2007; Wang
& Fulop, 2007), electrical equipment manufacturers
and their component suppliers (Zaheer, McEvily, &
Perrone, 1998), automaker–supplier relationships
in the U.S., Japan, and Korea (Dyer & Chu, 2011),
German subsidiary firms (Ambos, Asakawa, &
Ambos, 2011), import–export relationship marketing (Katsikeas, Skarmeas, & Bello, 2009), and the
joint production of patents (Brockman, Khurana, &
Zhong, 2018). The ubiquity and importance of
social trust as an informal institution is concisely
captured in McEvily, Perrone, and Zaheer’s (2003)
claim that trust is a fundamental organizing principle for all forms of human coordination, including political, economic, and social activities.
Our study extends this line of research by examining the link between the informal institution of
social trust and debt contract design (i.e., the
number and intensity of debt covenants) in a
cross-country setting. North (1991: 97) defines
and distinguishes between formal and informal
institutions: ‘‘Institutions are humanly devised
constraints that structure political, economic, and
social interaction. They consist of both informal
constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions,
and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights).’’ The formal institutions that support debt issuance include written
legal codes, such as contract law and judicial
procedures; in contrast, the informal institutions
that support debt issuance consist of unwritten
social norms and behaviors, such as social trust.
Since formal creditor–debtor contracts are inherently incomplete, few economic transactions are
more sensitive to the informal norms of social trust
than long-term promises to pay periodic coupons
and principal.1 We select an international setting
(i.e., Yankee bond issuances) to examine the role of
social trust in overcoming information and agency
problems because such problems are especially
acute when the transacting parties are separated
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by geography, language, culture, and social norms.
As stated in Ertug et al. (2013: 264), ‘‘While trust
plays an important role in interorganizational
relationships in general, it is even more crucial
when these relationships are between organizations
from different countries.’’ Building on this literature, our main research question is whether
stronger informal institutions in the form of social
trust can reduce the need for formal, restrictive
(and therefore costly) covenants in cross-border
bond issuances.
We use the definition of social trust provided by
Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995: 712): ‘‘the
willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the
actions of another party based on the expectation
that the other party will perform a particular action
important to the truster, irrespective of the ability
to monitor or control that other party.’’2 This
definition fits our empirical setting quite well, in
that a Yankee bond creditor is vulnerable to the
borrower’s commitment to perform future actions
(i.e., repayment of coupons and principal) that are
important to the creditor (truster). Debt covenants
are one mechanism used by creditors to help
monitor and control the borrowing party. Debt
covenants are legally binding clauses written in
indenture contracts whereby the debtor promises
that certain activities will be undertaken (i.e.,
affirmative covenants), or that certain activities
will not be undertaken (i.e., negative covenants).
Examples of affirmative covenants include providing creditors with audited financial statements,
maintaining a specific credit rating, or carrying
certain types of insurance policies. Examples of
negative covenants include restrictions on future
debt issuances, merger activities, or financial ratio
thresholds (e.g., interest coverage ratios).
After defining our key terms, we employ the
theoretical insight of rational choice institutionalism (Ingram & Clay, 2000; Shepsle, 1989) within
the framework of Williamson’s (2000) four-level
social analysis to formulate four hypotheses that
specify the direct and indirect relationships
between social trust and debt covenants. Specifically, we examine the mechanisms through which
an informal institution (social trust) affects transaction-level quantities (bond covenants) and prices
(borrowing costs) for international business enterprises. We first test for a direct causal relationship
from informal social trust to formal debt contracting, as trust imposes constraints on transactions
(i.e., Hypothesis 1). We then test for indirect
(interaction) effects of social trust on debt
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contracting through formal institutions including
investor protection and political institutions (i.e.,
Hypothesis 2), and governance structures including
firm-level governance and information asymmetry
(i.e., Hypothesis 3). We perform similar tests for the
direct and indirect relationship between social trust
and the cost of debt (i.e., Hypothesis 4).
We use the responses to the World Values Survey
(WVS) as a proxy for country-level social trust.
Specifically, we obtain the percentage of affirmative
responses to the question ‘‘Generally speaking,
would you say that most people can be trusted or
that you need to be very careful in dealing with
people?’’ This notion of trust is impersonal in
nature, as opposed to a personal concept of trust
that emerges from repeated dealings with the same
person or organization (Couper, Reuber, & Prashantham, 2020; Dudley & Zhang, 2016; Lai, Singh,
Alshwer, & Shaffer, 2014). We capture the restrictiveness of bond covenants using two related
measures: the Number of Covenants is the sum of
all restrictive covenants (i.e., financing, investing,
or payout covenants); and the Intensity of Covenants
is the sum of three indicator variables for the
presence of covenants in the three respective
categories.
Our empirical analyses are based on a final
sample of 934 Yankee bond issues by 31 countries
over the period 1989–2014. We conduct Poisson
regressions to determine the effect of social trust on
restrictive covenants written into Yankee bond
contracts, while controlling for issue-, firm-, and
country-level variables. To ensure the robustness of
our main evidence, we employ a three-level random coefficient Poisson model (RCM Poisson) that
accounts for the time series and multilevel nature
of our data (e.g., Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009; Dau,
2012). The results from the two estimation methods show that informal social trust plays a statistically and economically significant role in formal
debt contracting, both directly and indirectly, and
in terms of both restrictive covenant usage (i.e.,
Hypotheses 1–3) and the cost of debt (i.e., Hypothesis 4). After confirming our main hypotheses, we
perform a series of endogeneity and other robustness tests, including alternative measures of trust,
samples, empirical methods, and specifications of
the control variables. In all such tests, our baseline
results continue to hold.
Our study contributes to the growing literature
on the role of informal institutions in shaping the
behavior of international business enterprises. Kim,
Kim, and Zhou (2017) note that this literature is

relatively scarce compared to studies examining the
role of formal institutions, while Schoorman,
Mayer, and Davis (2007: 352) suggest that future
research should focus on ‘‘the role that international and cross-cultural dimensions play in the
model of trust.’’ One important issue often faced in
previous studies was how to distinguish between
the direct and indirect effects of informal institutions (Aggarwal, Faccio, Guedhami, & Kwok, 2016;
Xin & Pearce, 1996). Our study shows how an
informal social characteristic such as social trust
interacts with the country-level formal institutional
environment and firm-level governance structure
to influence transaction-level prices and quantities,
thereby providing a comprehensive view of the
multilevel links connecting a cultural attribute to
bond contracting. These results add support to the
rational choice approach to institutional analysis,
consistent with Hall and Taylor’s (1996: 956)
observation that ‘‘rational choice analysts have
begun to incorporate ‘culture’ or ‘beliefs’ into their
work to explain why actors move toward one
outcome when a conventional analysis specifies
many possible equilibrium outcomes.’’ By applying
Shepsle’s (1989: 136) concept of ‘‘structure-induced
equilibrium’’ from rational choice institutionalism
within Williamson’s (2000) social analysis, we
show that informal cultural characteristics such as
social trust generate significantly different equilibrium outcomes for international business enterprises in terms of bond covenants and pricing.
Extant literature on debt contracting considers
the role of the formal institutional environment
but largely overlooks the influence of more fundamental and informal social factors such as trust.3
Our new findings show that the effect of informal
social trust on debt contracting is comparable to
that of formal institutions; specifically, a onestandard-deviation increase in creditor rights (social trust) around the baseline mean is associated
with a 0.28 (0.22) decrease in the number of
covenants. Our study is also related to the recent
work of Hasan et al. (2017) who find that firms
located in U.S. counties with higher levels of social
capital incur lower bank loan spreads. We extend
Hasan et al. (2017) by focusing on cross-country,
rather than within-country, variation in social
capital, thus providing useful information to international business managers. Overall, our crosscountry study offers a rich laboratory in which to
examine the interactions between informal institutions (e.g., social trust) and formal institutions (e.g.,
legal codes, creditor rights, investor protection)
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BACKGROUND, THEORETICAL
UNDERPINNING, AND HYPOTHESIS
DEVELOPMENT
Background
Although business practitioners and scholars have
long observed a connection between social trust
and economic outcomes, formal theoretical analysis and empirical verification began in the 1980s
and 1990s. Several studies in this period examine
the effects of social capital on the real economy,
including the development of human capital
(Coleman, 1988), differences in economic performance between Northern and Southern Italy (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993), and general
economic prosperity (Fukuyama, 1995). Much of
this research can be summarized by Knack and
Keefer’s (1997: 1251) finding that ‘‘trust and civic
norms are stronger in nations with higher and
more equal incomes, with formal institutions that
restrain predatory actions of chief executives, and
with better-educated and ethnically homogeneous
populations.’’ The finding that formal institutions
can restrict the decisions and behaviors of individual actors is consistent with the approach of
‘‘choice-within-constraints’’ from rational choice
institutionalism (Campbell, 2004; Ingram & Clay,
2000).
More recent research has refined the theoretical
and empirical relationships between social trust
and specific economic outcomes. Zak and Knack
(2001) develop a theoretical model predicting that
societies with more trust have higher long-run
economic growth because of reduced risk and a
greater investment rate. Stulz and Williamson
(2003) show that a country’s main religion can
explain cross-country variation in creditor rights
better than legal origin, openness to trade, and
GDP per capita. Similar studies document that
social capital/trust plays a significant role in
explaining cross-country differences in financial
development (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2003),
national savings, entrepreneurship, and income
redistribution (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2006),
venture capital investment and success (Bottazzi,
Da Rin, & Hellmann, 2016), stock market participation (Guiso et al., 2008), and stock market
reactions to earnings announcements (Pevzner,
Xie, & Xin, 2015). Research has also shown that
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trust plays a significant role in the cross-border
activities between pairs of British and Indian SMEs
(Puthusserry, Child, & Khan, 2020), Mexican and
American alliance partners (Teegen, 1998), Japanese joint ventures with UK and Malaysian local
partners (Gill & Butler, 2003), and consumer perceptions of multinational firm reputations in the
chemical and pharmaceutical industry (Swoboda,
Huber, Schuster, & Hirschmann, 2017).
Using variations at the U.S. county level,
researchers have documented that social capital/
trust plays a significant role in the cost of bank
loans and public bonds (Hasan et al., 2017), as well
as agency costs, profitability, and firm valuations
(Hilary & Huang, 2015). At the firm level, a related
line of research examines the effect of crosssectional variation in corporate social responsibility
on stock returns (Lins, Servaes, & Tamayo, 2017)
and the pricing of public debt (Amiraslani, Lins,
Servaes, & Tamayo, 2017) during the 2008–2009
financial crisis.
We extend these studies by examining the link
between the informal institution of social trust and
the use of debt covenants in the context of crossborder bond issuances (i.e., Yankee bonds). A Yankee bond is a foreign bond issued in the U.S. and
denominated in U.S. dollars. In 2017, firms outside
the U.S., excluding financial institutions, sold
$338.2 billion in Yankee bonds according to data
provider Dealogic. Yankee bonds account for an
increasing share of total U.S. debt issuances. For
example, Yankee bonds represent 41% of all bond
issuances, which is the largest category of bonds
issued in the U.S. according to Market Business
News data from April 2015. The growing popularity
of Yankee bonds can be attributed at least in part to
the desire for higher yields among U.S. bond
investors.4
Two examples of Yankee bond issuances in our
sample include Petrobras and Royal Dutch Shell.
The Brazilian oil giant, Petrobras, issued $8.5
billion of Yankee bonds in March 2014 to raise
cash needed for its five-year investment plan. The
firm’s future plans include the sale of a series of
Yankee bonds in the U.S. market.5 Royal Dutch
Shell PLC, an Anglo-Dutch oil and gas company
headquartered in the Netherlands and incorporated
in the UK, plans to issue $4 billion of Yankee bonds
with maturities ranging from 2024 to 2049.6 These
and other Yankee bond issuances are supported by
major financial institutions such as Mizuho, which
seeks greater presence in the U.S. securities market
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by assisting Asian and European company
issuances.7
Our study is closely related to those of Qi et al.
(2011) and Miller and Reisel (2012), both of which
examine the impact of formal institutions on the
use of Yankee bond covenants. Qi et al. (2011: 235)
‘‘find that bonds of firms incorporated in countries
with stronger creditor rights use fewer covenants.’’
In a related study, Miller and Reisel (2012) show
that, while strong shareholder rights have little
impact on creditor–debtor relationships, strong
creditor rights decrease the need for bond covenants, consistent with Qi et al.’s (2011) main
finding. In terms of Williamson’s (2000) framework, these results suggest that creditor rights have
a direct effect on international debt contracts. We
follow both Qi et al. (2011) and Miller and Reisel
(2012) in employing a sample of Yankee bonds to
test our main hypotheses. Our study differs, however, in that we move the level of analysis up to an
informal institution embedded in a country’s social
fabric–social trust. More specifically, we apply the
approach of rational choice institutionalism to
examine the degree to which informal institutions
(social trust), interacting with formal institutions
(creditor rights), constrain the debt contracts
between individual creditors and debtors.
There are two general themes that run through
these related studies: (1) both informal institutions
and formal institutions have a significant effect on
economic outcomes; and (2) the connection
between institutions and economic outcomes can
be studied formally using economic theory and
empirical research methods, consistent with the
two main propositions of new institutional economics in general and rational choice institutionalism in particular (Campbell, 2004; Hall & Taylor,
1996; Ingram & Clay, 2000; Shepsle, 1989; Weingast, 2002). The debt market is an ideal setting in
which to examine the economic role of social trust
because the ability to make credible commitments
about future contingencies depends on one’s trustworthiness. As stated in Ingram and Clay (2000:
528–9):
the problem of credible commitment is faced by any party to
an exchange who wants to promise in the present to do
something in the future that may not be in his or her
interest to do when the future actually arrives. The problem
is endemic because in almost every exchange there is at least
a moment when one of the parties has control over all or
most of the goods and must decide whether to follow
through on the agreed upon bargain or make a grab for
more.

Nowhere is this problem more acute than in the
debt markets where creditors exchange large sums
of money in the present for debtors’ promissory
notes of future repayments.

What Is Social Trust?
Since the informal institution of social trust encompasses a potentially broad conceptual range, it is
important to specify ‘‘the level, nature, and meaning of trust’’ (Zaheer & Zaheer, 2006: 22) that we
employ in this study. We distinguish between
personal trust and (impersonal) societal trust.
Dudley and Zhang (2016: 363) describe these two
types of trust:
Specifically, when describing the relationship between a
principal and an agent, two different types of trust are
relevant. The first notion is personal trust, which is a set of
beliefs about a specific person. This notion involves repeated
interactions between two individuals. … The second notion
of trust, societal trust, is easier to measure, but has a less
obvious relationship with capital-raising activities of the
firm. Societal trust refers to a set of beliefs about the behavior
of a group of individuals. This notion of trust is rooted in
deep-seated beliefs about others and it involves a person’s
cultural and religious backgrounds.

Our study focuses on the second notion of trust
as ‘‘a set of beliefs about the behavior of a group of
individuals.’’ It is impersonal in nature, and not
based on repeated interactions between particular
persons.8 Consistent with this notion of trust,
Parkhe (1998: 228) suggests that trust involves
uncertainty about the future and vulnerability (i.e.,
risk of losing something of value) to another party
whose behavior is not under one’s control. This
definition of trust applies quite well to a creditor–
debtor setting in general (i.e., uncertainty about
future payments and vulnerability to debtor behavior), and the international debt contracting setting
in particular (i.e., less ability to monitor and
control debtor behavior across national boundaries). Our proxy for this view of social trust is based
on a widely used measure from the WVS, specifically, the country-level average percentage of affirmative responses to the question ‘‘Generally
speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted or that you need to be very careful in
dealing with people?’’
It is also important to note that there are
potential discrepancies between our unit of measurement and our units of analysis. We use a proxy
for social trust based on the WVS question, which is
a within-country measure of social trust between
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individuals, and then compare these values across
countries (e.g., Ahern et al., 2015). Our research
design, however, treats firm managers operating in
a particular country as possessing the same social
trust attribute as that of the overall country. That
said, there are several studies suggesting that this
discrepancy is unlikely to be problematic. For
example, Ertug et al. (2013: 264) argue that ‘‘The
differences in culture, norms, and institutions that
produce different levels of propensity to trust
between individuals from different countries are
also likely to be evident in the practices of companies from those countries;’’ Parkhe (1991: 583)
claims that ‘‘the influence of a society’s culture
permeates all aspects of life within the society
including the norms, values, and behaviors of
managers in its national companies;’’ and Harzing
and Sorge (2003: 206) find that foreign subsidiaries
of MNCs are ‘‘firmly and primarily impregnated by
the country of origin.’’
Another potential discrepancy in our units of
analysis is the assumption that outside creditors
(i.e., individuals and institutions who buy Yankee
bonds) have a similar assessment of the bondissuing country’s social trust as that of the insider
citizens. Specifically, we assume that, if the citizens
of a particular country possess high (low) levels of
social trust between themselves, then outsider
creditors will impute similarly high (low) levels of
social trust to the same country. While this
assumption might be considered less than ideal, it
is consistent with the agency cost of debt framework that we develop below, in which factors that
mitigate agency costs (i.e., within the country) will
benefit all creditors—including those who reside
outside the country. In addition, the notion that
creditors outside the country impute a similar level
of trust as that existing between creditors within
the country is a commonly used assumption, both
explicitly and implicitly, by related studies (e.g.,
Ahern et al., 2015; Kanagaretnam et al., 2019; Li
et al., 2019; Meng & Yin, 2019).

Hypothesis Development
After defining social trust and our unit of analysis,
we employ rational choice institutionalism within
Williamson’s (2000) theoretical framework to formulate and test our four main hypotheses. Campbell (2004: 15) argues that one of the most
important contributions of rational choice institutionalists is the development of ‘‘the so-called
choice-within-constraints approach—a view that
takes seriously that institutions, including norms
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as well as formal rules and regulations, limit the
range of choices individuals are likely to make as
they pursue their interests.’’ In our study, we indeed
‘‘take seriously’’ the role played by informal and
formal institutions in influencing investor and
managerial choices as they pursue their interests
in the debt market.9 Ingram and Clay (2000: 526)
further describe the choice-within-constraints
approach of rational choice institutionalism by
identifying three key characteristics as follows:
First, it holds that actors are boundedly rational in the sense
that they pursue a broad set of self interests, but with limited
knowledge and cognitive capacity. Second, institutions are
defined as the rules, combined with their enforcement
mechanisms, that constrain choices of actors. These rules
include the laws of states, the policies of organizations, and
the norms of social groups. Third, institutions ideally
constrain actors such that their best choices are consistent
with the collective good, enabling, for example, mutually
profitable exchange between actors.

The motivation for our hypotheses follows
closely from these three characteristics. First, Yankee bond investors are subject to bounded rationality and limited knowledge as they operate in an
environment of information asymmetry (i.e., not
knowing how Yankee bond issuers will behave after
the receipt of funds). Second, Yankee bond investors will use the formal institutional mechanism of
writing debt covenants in an attempt to constrain
issuers’ opportunistic choices. Third, Yankee bond
investors and issuers are more likely to agree on
mutually profitable bond covenants if formal and
informal institutions (e.g., social trust) are effective
in constraining opportunism. So, we begin our
hypotheses development with the broad insights
from rational choice institutionalism, and then
tighten the focus using Williamson’s (2000) fourlevel social framework. We end this section with
four hypotheses that posit the specific mechanisms
through which the informal institution of social
trust can influence debt contracting. Figures 1 and
2 summarize our overall theoretical framework.
Within the framework of new institutionalism’s
choice-within-constraints approach, we utilize Williamson’s (2000) four-level social analysis to specify
more concretely the relationships between informal and formal institutions. Williamson’s Level 1
comprises a country’s informal institutions and
customs (e.g., social trust) that are embedded in the
social fabric. Highly persistent over time, these
cultural traditions are effectively exogenous and
not subject to social engineering. Level 2 comprises
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Figure 1 Agency costs of debt in international bond contracting.

Figure 2 Informal institutions (trust), formal institutions, governance structures, and agency costs of debt.
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a country’s political, judicial, and economic institutions, while Level 3 comprises its governance
structures, which influence individuals’ incentives
while playing the game. Level 4 comprises economic transactions that together determine prices,
quantities, and allocation of resources. Within this
hierarchical construct, higher-level informal institutional structures (e.g., social trust, unwritten
norms) have a direct impact on lower-level institutional structures (e.g., legal institutions, property
rights), but lower-level institutions have little to no
impact on higher-level institutions. Our focus in
this study is to examine the role played by a Level 1
informal institution (social trust) on Level 4 outcomes (debt covenants), while also taking into
account any moderating effects from Levels 2 and 3
(formal rules and institutions).
Agency costs are the linchpin that connect social
trust (i.e., Level 1 informal institution) to the use of
debt covenants (i.e., Level 4 economic transactions). Debt covenants are costly to establish and to
monitor, so they are put in place only to the extent
that they are expected to reduce agency problems
between shareholders and bondholders. Since
higher social trust reduces agency costs (Coleman,
1988; Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993;
Fukuyama, 1995; Knack and Keefer, 1997), then
higher social trust will reduce the need for costly
debt covenants, all else equal. Qi, Roth, and Wald
(2011: 235) highlight this key connection between
agency costs and the use of restrictive debt
covenants as follows:
Smith and Warner (1979) detail how restrictive covenants
can mitigate agency conflicts between shareholders and
bondholders. Management and shareholders are willing to
adopt restrictive covenants in debt contracts to prevent firms
from taking actions that expropriate creditors. Although
including covenants reduces operational flexibility, it can
maximize firm value by increasing debt capacity and reducing debt-financing costs. The number and types of covenants depends on the degree of agency conflicts, and on the
costs and benefits of including restrictive covenants.

Principal-agent theory provides the mechanism
that links higher (lower) social trust to fewer (more)
restrictive debt covenants. Ross (1973) describes the
inherent conflicts of interest between contracting
parties within the context of principals and their
agents. In our study, the principal is represented by
the purchaser of Yankee bonds, and the agent is
represented by the firms that issue Yankee bonds
(i.e., a stockholder–bondholder conflict commonly
referred to as the agency cost of debt). Smith and
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Warner (1979) describe four sources of agency costs
of debt, as illustrated in our Figure 1: dividend
payments, claim dilution, asset substitution, and
underinvestment. Similar to a firm’s domestic
creditors, Yankee bondholders are exposed to the
risk that issuing firms might pay out unsustainably
large dividends to existing shareholders, thereby
increasing the probability of future default. These
bondholders are also exposed to the risk that their
claims to future cash flows and asset liquidations
could be diluted by additional debt issuances. An
asset substitution problem can arise if issuing firms
substitute high-risk projects for low-risk projects
after selling their Yankee bonds to unsuspecting
bondholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Finally, an
underinvestment problem occurs whenever issuing
firms forgo profitable investment opportunities
because Yankee bondholders would capture a disproportionate share of firm value resulting from
such investments (Myers, 1977).
Although each of these four sources of agency
costs of debt is inherent in all stockholder–bondholder relationships, they are especially acute when
principals and agents are separated by geography,
language, culture, and institutional background
(Ertug et al., 2013). As argued by Thompson
(1996: 375), ‘‘Assessing whether the other party is
likely to fulfill all obligations can be arduous when
a transaction is international.’’ This additional
arduousness is caused by the heightened possibility
that the cross-border transacting parties have
‘‘asymmetric conceptions of trust’’ (Zaheer & Zaheer, 2006: 21). Contract enforcement can also be
more challenging and expensive in a cross-border
setting where Yankee bond issuers and owners are
located in different countries. Legally binding bond
covenants are a significant tool to reduce the
additional risk of cross-border bond issuances. As
described by Smith and Warner (1979: 122), bond
covenants represent ‘‘a persistent phenomenon’’
that has been used for centuries to mitigate agency
costs of debt. They explain this persistence (1979:
152) as follows: ‘‘Observed debt covenants reduce
the costs associated with the conflict of interest
between bondholders and stockholders; the ingenuity with which debt contracts are written indicates the strong economic incentives for the firm’s
owners to lower the agency costs which can result
from having risk debt in the firm’s capital structure.’’ Smith and Warner also make it clear that,
while there are benefits to adding restrictive
covenants to debt contracts, there are also costs;
in fact (1979: 153), ‘‘the direct and opportunity
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costs of complying with the contractual restrictions
appear to be substantial.’’
Social trust mitigates the agency costs of debt and
thus influences the need for creditors to rely on
restrictive debt covenants. Hasan et al. (2017: 1021)
maintain that within-country social capital promotes trust and helps constrain opportunistic firm
behaviors in debt contracting by ‘‘increasing decision-makers’ perceived marginal costs of perpetrating
opportunistic
firm
behaviors
against
debtholder.’’ They assert that, in high-trust societies, opportunistic behaviors are unacceptable and
can therefore lead to social sanctions (Coleman,
1988), increased aversive emotional states such as
guilt and shame, and internal discomfort, even
when such behaviors are unobserved. Building on
Hasan et al. (2017), we argue that within-country
social trust affects international debt contracting.
The idea is that the disciplinary effect of trust on
opportunistic and self-serving corporate dealings in
debt contracting (i.e., agency costs of debt) will
benefit all bondholders, both domestic and Yankee
bondholders, as shown in Figure 1. Put differently,
the lower agency costs of debt for bond-issuing
firms from high-trust countries are not exclusive to
domestic bondholders, but benefit all creditors,
including Yankee bondholders. The role of trust in
reducing the cost of debt could be even more
important for Yankee bondholders, who likely face
higher agency costs of debt and more information
problems due to the international nature of the
contract.
To the extent that social trust reduces the need
for costly covenants (i.e., informal trust substitutes
for formal covenants), Yankee bond-issuing firms
located in high-trust countries can mitigate such
costs by reducing the number or restrictiveness of
covenants. This insight, consistent with rational
choice institutionalism’s concept of ‘‘choicewithin-constraints’’ (i.e., choice of covenants
within constraint of social trust), motivates our
first hypothesis. In addition, our first hypothesis is
consistent with related research showing that societal trust has been an effective mechanism in
reducing the cost of borrowing (Meng & Yin,
2019), IPO underpricing (Li et al., 2019), and
excessive risk taking by banks (Kanagaretnam
et al., 2019).
The discussion above suggests that social trust
has a direct and significant impact on debt contracting. More specifically, a higher level of social
trust in the issuing firm’s country of origin will lead
Yankee bond investor-creditors to demand fewer

and less intensive safeguards against contract
breaches. More formally stated,
Hypothesis 1: A higher level of social trust
reduces the use of restrictive covenants in debt
contracts.
We test Hypothesis 1 by regressing the number
(and intensity) of Yankee bond covenants on our
measure of social trust and a set of country-, firm-,
and issue-level control variables.
Next, we posit that the informal institution of
social trust and formal institutions function as
substitute mechanisms in terms of their impact on
debt covenants; specifically, when trust is high
(low), the marginal impact of formal institutions
on bond covenants is low (high). While Hypothesis
1 seeks to establish a direct causal connection from
social trust to bond covenants, Hypothesis 2 seeks
to establish an indirect connection from social trust
to bond covenants running through social trust’s
interaction with country-level formal institutions.
In a parallel manner, Holmes, Miller, Hitt, and
Salmador (2013: 531) show that ‘‘the country’s
informal institutions, in the form of cultural
dimensions of collectivism and future orientation,
shape the country’s formal institutions’’ including
political, economic, and regulatory institutions.
Holmes et al. (2013) confirm that informal features
(i.e., collectivism and future orientation) have an
indirect impact on economic transactions (i.e., the
quantity of inward foreign direct investment)
through their interaction with formal institutions
(i.e., political, economic, regulatory institutions).
Our second hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) follows this
same line of reasoning; specifically, we posit that an
informal institution (i.e., social trust) has an indirect impact on economic transactions (i.e., the
quantity and intensity of bond covenants) through
its interaction with formal institutions (e.g., creditor rights, rule of law).
Combining Hypothesis 1’s claim that higher
social trust will reduce the number and intensity
of covenants with the results of previous studies
showing that stronger country-level formal institutions will also reduce the number and intensity of
covenants (Miller & Reisel, 2012; Qi et al.,
2010, 2011), we expect that social trust and formal
institutions will act as substitute mechanisms in
determining the number and intensity of covenants. Specifically, if formal institutions are strong
(weak), then the impact of social trust on covenants
will be less (more) significant. This perspective is
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consistent with prior research. Guiso, Sapienza, and
Zingales (2004) show that the effect of social capital
on households’ use of financial instruments (e.g.,
checks, stock, institutional credit) is stronger where
legal enforcement is inefficient. Pevzner et al.
(2015) show that social trust matters more to
investor reactions to earnings news when investor
protection is weak, suggesting a substitute relationship between trust and formal institutions. Meng
and Yin (2019) document a similar interaction
between trust and country-level governance indicators in determining the cost of debt financing.
Following the insights of Guiso et al. (2004),
Holmes et al. (2013), Meng and Yin (2019), and
Pevzner et al. (2015), our second hypothesis posits
that social trust also affects debt contracting
through its interaction with formal institutions
(i.e., legal system, political system, prevalence of
family/interlocking firms). Formally stated,
Hypothesis 2: There is a substitution effect
between social trust and country-level formal
institutions in determining the use of restrictive
covenants in debt contracts.
Specifically, this hypothesis posits that the relationship between social trust and the use of
restrictive covenants will be weakened when country-level formal institutions are stronger. We test
Hypothesis 2 by regressing the number (and intensity) of Yankee bond covenants on our measure of
social trust, various measures of the country-level
formal institutional environment, the interaction
between social trust and these measures of the
country-level formal institutional environment,
and our set of control variables.
Following the same reasoning that motivated
Hypothesis 2 (i.e., that of Holmes et al. (2013) and
Meng and Yin (2019)), we posit that social trust and
governance structures will act as substitute mechanisms in determining the number and intensity of
covenants; specifically, when governance structures
are strong (weak), the marginal impact of social
trust will be low (high). Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell
(2005) show that corporate governance has a
significant impact on the cost of borrowing. Combining our Hypothesis 1 claim that higher social
trust reduces the need for covenants with Klock
et al.’s finding that stronger corporate governance
reduces the cost of debt financing, we expect to find
an indirect (substitution) effect from social trust to
the number and intensity of covenants that run
through the firm’s governance and information
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asymmetry. This posited substitution effect, similar
to that in Hypothesis 2, is consistent with the
findings of Meng and Yin (2019) and Xin and
Pearce (1996).
Based on this discussion, our third hypothesis
holds that social trust affects debt contracting
through its interaction with governance mechanisms (i.e., firm-level governance and information
asymmetry). Formally,
Hypothesis 3: There is a substitution effect
between social trust and the firm-level governance and information asymmetry in determining the use of restrictive covenants in debt
contracts.
Specifically, this hypothesis posits that the relationship between social trust and the use of
restrictive covenants will be weakened when firmlevel formal institutions are stronger. We test
Hypothesis 3 by regressing the number (and intensity) of Yankee bond debt covenants on our measure of social trust, various measures of firm-level
governance and information asymmetry, the interaction between social trust and these measures of
firm-level governance and information asymmetry,
and our set of control variables.
Our fourth hypothesis examines interaction
effects between debt covenants and the cost of
debt, all within the context of social trust. Previous
research (e.g., Barclay & Smith, 1995; Myers, 1977;
Smith & Warner, 1979) shows that agency and
asymmetric information problems can be alleviated
by an appropriate choice of debt maturity, covenants, and seniority. Creditors require a larger risk
premium on covenant-free debt to compensate for
the risk that the borrower’s credit quality will
decline. All else equal, fewer covenants lead to
higher borrowing costs. Although the direct effect
of higher social trust should reduce borrowing costs
(Meng & Yin, 2019), higher social trust also reduces
the use of covenants (Hypothesis 1)—and fewer
covenants, all else equal, will increase borrowing
costs. So, while higher social trust will directly
lower borrowing costs, it can also reduce the use of
covenants, which will (indirectly) increase borrowing costs. The net effect of covenants on borrowing
costs is an empirical question that we address with
Hypothesis 4. In summary, we predict that higher
social trust reduces borrowing costs by decreasing
agency and asymmetric information problems (a
direct effect). In addition, higher social trust can
(indirectly) increase borrowing costs through its
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effect on the number and intensity of covenants (as
examined in Hypothesis 1; an indirect effect). Our
fourth hypothesis is thus stated as follows:
Hypothesis 4: A higher level of social trust
lowers borrowing costs by mitigating agency and
information problems (direct effect); there is also
a substitution effect between social trust and the
use of restrictive covenants on borrowing costs
(indirect effect).

DATA, EMPIRICAL DESIGN, AND DESCRIPTIVE
STATISTICS
Sample
We begin the sample selection process with foreign
bonds issued in the U.S. (Yankee bonds) contained
in the Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD),
which is widely used in studies on bond covenants
(e.g., Miller & Reisel, 2012; Qi et al., 2011; Reisel,
2014). Our initial sample comprises 3064 issues by
borrowers from 52 countries in the period
1989–2014. We exclude bonds issued before 1989
because of the poor quality of covenant data before
1989 (Miller & Reisel, 2012). To ensure the validity
of covenant information, we also exclude from this
sample medium-term notes, private placements,
bonds with special characteristics such as convertible, pass-through, or payment-in-kind features, as
well as issues with an offering amount that exceeds
$50 billion or an offering yield that is greater than
50 basis points. Our initial sample represents an
update to Qi et al.’s (2011) and Miller and Reisel’s
(2012) samples, which end in 2007. Next, we merge
the FISD data with Compustat (North America and
Global) by manually matching company names.
This yields a sample of 1650 bonds across 38
countries. We then merge with the WVS to obtain
data on trust. We exclude observations with missing values for variables used in our main regression
and observations with a missing Campbell (1996)
industry classification. This procedure yields a final
sample of 934 bond issues from 31 countries.10
Variable Construction
Covenants
Our main dependent variable is the total number of
covenants written into bonds issued by non-U.S.
firms. Following Miller and Reisel (2012), we count
the number of restrictive covenants in each outstanding debt issue. However, while the total
number of covenants gives one measure of

covenant use, it obscures the fact that some types
of firm activities face more potential restrictions
than others. To address this concern, we use as an
alternative dependent variable the intensity of
covenants, which is equal to the sum of three
indicators equal to 1 if the debt contract contains a
covenant in the given category. This alternative
measure assigns equal weight to three categories of
restrictions on firm activities, namely, restrictions
on a firm’s financing, investment, and payout
activities.
Covenants on financing activities are designed to
protect bondholders from claim dilution by limiting the firm’s ability to enter into future obligations
that could lead to bankruptcy. This category contains seven covenant terms: (1) the issuer is not
allowed to issue secured debt unless it secures the
current issue on a pari passu basis; (2) the issuer is
not allowed to issue debt with initial maturity of
one year or longer; (3) the issuer is not allowed to
incur additional debt with limits on the absolute
dollar amount of debt outstanding or the percentage of total capital; (4) the issuer is restricted on the
amount of senior debt; (5) the issuer is not allowed
to issue subordinated debt; (6) the issuer is not
allowed to issue additional debt unless the issuer
achieves or maintains a certain profitability level;
and (7) the issuer is restricted on sale–leaseback
transactions, which involve raising capital by selling an asset and simultaneously leasing the asset
back for a fixed term at an agreed-upon rate.
Covenants on investment activities are designed
to protect bondholders from asset substitution
problems by limiting the firm’s investments in
excessively risky projects. This category contains
four covenant terms: (1) the issuer is restricted on
investment policy to reduce risky investments; (2)
the issuer is restricted on mergers or consolidations;
(3) the issuer is restricted on selling its assets; and
(4) the issuer is required to use proceeds from the
sale of assets to redeem bonds at par or at a
premium.
The last category of covenants relates to corporate payouts. These restrictions are designed to
protect bondholders from wealth transfers by limiting the firm’s ability to transfer assets (through
cash dividends) to shareholders. This category
contains two covenant terms: (1) the issuer is not
allowed to make dividend-related payments to
shareholders or other entities above a certain
percentage of net income or some other accounting
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ratio; and (2) the issuer is restricted on nondividend-related payments to shareholders or other
entities.

Trust
Following prior literature, we construct our trust
variable based on the WVS question ‘‘Generally
speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted or that you need to be very careful in
dealing with people?’’11 Specifically, we calculate
the level of trust in a country as the mean
percentage response in the country, where a
response is recorded as 1 if the participant reports
that most people can be trusted, and 0 otherwise.
This question is documented in all six waves of the
survey: 1981, 1990, 1995, 1999, 2005, and 2010.12
We match the trust variable to firm-year observations in commensurate periods. For country-years
with missing trust values, we fill in the missing
values based on the previous wave. In robustness
tests, we adopt alternative measures of trust,
including 100% + (the mean percentage response
to ‘‘most people can be trusted’’) - (the mean
percentage response to ‘‘can’t be too careful’’) as
well as the mean response to the survey question
asking the extent to which the participant trusts
their neighborhood. Detailed variable definitions
are reported in Online Appendix Table IA1.
Empirical design
We estimate several specifications of the following
model using a Poisson regression13:
Covenantsj;f ;i;c;t ¼ a0 þ a1 Trustc;t1 þ a2 ILVj;t
þ a3 FLVf ;t1 þ a4 CLVc;t1 þ lt þ li
þ ej;f ;i;c;t ;
ð1Þ
where j is a bond issue index, f is a firm index, I is an
industry index, c is a country index, and t is a year
index. The dependent variable, Covenants, is either
Number of Covenants or Intensity of Covenants. The
treatment variable of interest, Trust, is our WVSbased measure of trust. ILV is a vector of issue-level
control variables: Amount (natural logarithm of the
bond issue’s offering amount), Maturity (the maturity of the bond issue in days), and Orthogonalized
Rating (the residuals obtained by regressing bond
ratings on Trust).14 These variables come from FISD.
FLV is a vector of firm-level control variables: Size
(natural logarithm of total assets), Leverage (total
debt over total assets), Interest Coverage (earnings
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before interest and taxes over interest expenses),
Profitability (earnings before interest and taxes over
total assets), Capital Expenditure (capital expenditure over total assets), and Tangibility [following
Berger, Ofek, & Swary 1996, (0.715 9 receivables + 0.547 9 inventories + cash + 0.535 9 net
property, plant, and equipment)/total assets]. These
variables are collected from Compustat Global. CLV
is a vector of country-level control variables: GDP
(logarithm of GDP per capita), GDP Growth (growth
of GDP per capita), Financial Development (private
credit to GDP), Inflation, Creditor Rights, Rule of Law,
and Control of Corruption. These variables are
obtained from the World Development Indicators
database, the World Governance Indicators (WGI)
database, and Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer
(2007).15 Following a standard practice in the literature (e.g., Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009; Dau,
2012), we lag Trust, FLV, and CLV to ensure that
bondholders have access to relevant country- and
firm-level information at the issue date, and to
mitigate potential reverse causality issues. We follow extant literature in choosing the controls to
include in ILV, FLV, and CLV (e.g., Barclay & Smith,
1995; Chava, Kumar, & Warga, 2010; Miller &
Reisel, 2012; Qi et al., 2011). Finally, we control for
year (lt ) and industry (li ) effects in all regressions,
and we cluster standard errors at the country
level.16

Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 summarizes our sample of bond issues in
the initial sample and the Compustat subsample.
Our initial sample comprises international public
debt offerings from 1989 to 2014 and represents an
update to Qi et al.’s (2011) and Miller and Reisel’s
(2012) samples. In general, our initial sample
displays the same characteristics as in Qi et al.
(2011) and Miller and Reisel (2012). Panel A, which
reports bond characteristics and frequency by
period, shows that the average offering amount is
$573.93 million, consistent with the notion that
the Yankee bond market is one of the few markets
in which a foreign entity can issue large amounts of
long-term fixed-rate debt (Karolyi & Johnston,
1998). Moreover, the use of covenants appears to
be common, with a median of three covenants per
bond. Most of the bonds are senior, callable, and
have a maturity between 5 and 15 years.
Panel B of Table 1 shows the frequency by
country for the final sample, which covers 31
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countries. Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Miller
& Puthenpurackal, 2002; Miller & Reisel, 2012), this
sample is dominated by Canada (37.79%) followed
by the UK (21.52%). At the other end of the
spectrum, countries such as Colombia, India, and
Indonesia have relatively few Yankee bond issues,
with 0.11% of the observations each.17
Panel C of Table 1 summarizes firm and country
characteristics for the Compustat subsample. Our
main variable of interest, Trust, ranges from a low
of 0.08 for Peru to a high of 0.65 for Norway, with
an average of 0.35 and a standard deviation of 0.13.
Importantly for our purposes, these figures suggest
that there is a large degree of variation in the level
of within-country trust across the globe.
Online Appendix Table IA3 presents Pearson
correlation coefficients for our key regression variables. We find that Trust is significantly negatively
related to our proxies for restrictive covenants,
providing preliminary evidence that firms from
countries with high levels of trust tend to issue
fewer covenants. With very few exceptions, the
correlation coefficients between the key explanatory variables are low. Notably, we observe a high
correlation between trust and the rule of law
(corruption) at 0.57 (0.59).18 To test for multicollinearity, we calculate and report variance inflation factors (VIFs) in all regressions. The VIF values
are generally below 10, especially for our main
analysis, suggesting that multicollinearity is unlikely to affect our inferences (Dau, 2012).

EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Main Evidence
Table 2 presents our main evidence on the relationship between trust and debt covenants. Panel A
shows the results using a Poisson regression. In
Model 1, we regress the total number of covenants
across all categories on Trust; that is, we regress
Eq. (1) without controls and fixed effects. We find
that the coefficient on Trust is negative and significant at the 1% level (a1 = -0.516; p = 0.001),19consistent with Hypothesis 1, which holds that
covenants are more prevalent in bonds issued by
firms from countries with a low level of trust. In
Model 2, our baseline specification, we add to
Model 1 controls for issue-, firm-, and country-level
factors that may influence debt covenants as well as
industry and year fixed effects; that is, we estimate
Eq. (1). The coefficient on Trust continues to be
negative and statistically significant (a1 = -0.574;

p = 0.005). This effect is also economically significant: a one-standard-deviation increase in Trust
around its mean leads to an average decrease in the
number of covenants of 0.22. By comparison, we
find that a one-standard-deviation increase in
Creditor Rights around its mean results in an average
decrease in the number of covenants of 0.28
(consistent with the finding in prior literature that
country-level legal protection of creditors can substitute for contract-level covenants; Miller & Reisel,
2012; Qi et al., 2011).20 These results support the
view that higher levels of trust within a particular
country reduce the agency costs of debt for U.S.
bondholders, bringing positive externalities of trust
and consequently reducing the need for debt
covenants.
In Models 3, 4, and 5 of Table 2, we investigate
the effect of trust on the number of covenants used
in the financing, investment, and payout categories, respectively. We find that trust significantly
reduces the use of restrictive covenants on investment and payout activities, which suggests that
trust mitigates opportunistic behavior such as riskshifting and wealth transfers. In Model 6, we use
our alternative measure of debt covenants, Intensity
of Covenants, which assigns equal weights to the
three categories of restrictive covenants. We again
document a negative and significant coefficient
(a1 = -0.420; p = 0.007) on Trust.21
Since our research question deals with three
levels of analysis, we employ a mixed-level modeling that accounts for the multilevel and time series
nature of the data. More specifically, we follow Dau
(2012) and use a three-level random coefficient
Poisson model (RCM Poisson) (Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, & Pickles, 2005). According to Dau (2012:
268), ‘‘when compared to general linear models,
RCM provides several important benefits that make
it more suitable to test these types of analyses. It is
robust to missing data and error structure sphericity
violations (Ployhart, Holtz, & Bliese, 2002). Moreover, it models each subject within each level
separately, allowing for a much more accurate
specification (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).’’ Similar
to our setting, Dau’s model uses (2012: 268) ‘‘a
three-level RCM with observations for each year
(level 1) nested within firms (level 2) and firms, in
turn, nested within countries (level 3).’’ Based on
our estimated RCM in Panel B of Table 2, we find
that our earlier results continue to hold; that is,
higher levels of trust reduce the use of debt
covenants. The coefficient on Trust is negative
and significant at the 5% level when we consider
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics for bond issues.

Initial sample (n = 3064)
Mean

Median

Panel A: Bond characteristics and frequency by time period
Offering amount (million)
573.93
350.00
Offering yield (%)
6.50
6.46
Number of covenants per bond
3.14
3.00
Percentage of transactions:
Senior secured
5.61
Senior
84.11
Subordinated
8.06
Callable
59.79
Low maturity (\ 5 years)
11.95
High maturity ([ 15 years)
14.62
Number of observations
No.

Percentage

Panel B: Frequency by country, final sample
Argentina
5
0.54
Australia
48
5.14
Brazil
16
1.71
Canada
353
37.79
Chile
5
0.54
China
4
0.43
Colombia
1
0.11
Finland
3
0.32
France
62
6.64
Germany
12
1.28
Hong Kong
6
0.64
India
1
0.11
Indonesia
1
0.11
Israel
4
0.43
Italy
4
0.43
Japan
3
0.32
Korea, Rep.
17
1.82
Malaysia
1
0.11
Mexico
62
6.64
Netherlands
70
7.49
Norway
14
1.50
Peru
7
0.75
Philippines
4
0.43
Poland
6
0.64
Russian Federation
1
0.11
Singapore
6
0.64
Spain
5
0.54
Sweden
8
0.86
Switzerland
3
0.32
Thailand
1
0.11
United Kingdom
201
21.52
Mean

Std. dev.

Mean

Median

Std. dev.

692.70
2.88
2.29

628.61
6.07
2.96

450.00
6.08
3.00

736.47
2.73
2.10

3.21
85.76
8.67
62.79
12.79
17.15
Number of covenants

Intensity of covenants

Total

Finance

Invest

Payout

Total

3.20
2.27
3.00
3.86
3.80
1.75
3.00
4.00
2.92
2.67
0.83
2.00
0.00
2.75
1.50
2.67
3.35
4.00
3.77
2.73
3.79
3.71
7.00
6.00
5.00
4.00
3.00
2.63
6.00
3.00
2.66

1.60
1.04
1.13
1.59
1.80
0.75
1.00
2.00
1.23
1.17
0.50
0.00
0.00
0.75
1.00
1.00
1.65
2.00
1.68
0.81
1.86
2.00
3.00
2.00
3.00
1.33
1.00
1.00
2.67
1.00
0.94

1.60
1.15
1.69
1.96
2.00
1.00
2.00
2.00
1.44
1.25
0.33
2.00
0.00
1.75
0.50
1.67
1.59
2.00
1.81
1.67
1.71
1.71
3.00
3.50
2.00
2.33
2.00
1.50
2.67
2.00
1.56

0.00
0.08
0.19
0.31
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.26
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.12
0.00
0.29
0.24
0.21
0.00
1.00
0.50
0.00
0.33
0.00
0.13
0.67
0.00
0.16

1.60
1.29
1.56
1.97
2.00
1.00
2.00
2.00
1.53
1.58
0.50
1.00
0.00
1.25
1.25
2.00
1.65
2.00
1.90
1.50
2.07
1.71
3.00
2.50
2.00
2.33
2.00
1.25
2.67
2.00
1.42

Median

Panel C: Firm and country characteristics for the Compustat subsample
Size
9.63
9.68
Leverage
0.35
0.30
Interest Coverage
4.20
2.55
Profitability
0.10
0.10

Journal of International Business Studies

Compustat subsample (n = 1650)

Std. dev.
2.19
0.37
69.29
0.14

N
1650
1649
1626
1618

Trust

0.17
0.50
0.08
0.38
0.22
0.53
0.14
0.55
0.19
0.32
0.40
0.21
0.37
0.23
0.27
0.37
0.30
0.09
0.18
0.47
0.65
0.08
0.09
0.17
0.23
0.15
0.32
0.63
0.34
0.41
0.29
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Table 1 (Continued)

Capital Expenditure
Tangibility
Trust
GDP
GDP Growth (%)
Financial Development
Inflation
Creditor Rights
Rule of Law
Control of Corruption

Mean

Median

Std. dev.

N

0.09
0.45
0.35
31,593.67
1.57
132.81
4.08
1.93
1.36
1.77

0.08
0.47
0.37
28,620.41
1.55
128.72
2.17
1.00
1.68
2.23

0.07
0.14
0.13
16,525.39
2.40
54.90
49.91
1.36
0.68
0.85

1412
1423
1624
1611
1611
1331
1611
1650
1650
1650

The sample consists of foreign bonds issued in the U.S. (Yankee bonds) contained in the FISD for the period 1989–2014. The Compustat subsample
includes bonds from issuing companies with non-missing total assets in Compustat. Offering amount and Size are denominated in U.S. dollars. Number
of Covenants refers to the total number of restrictive covenants based on three categories, namely, restrictions on firm-level financing, investment, and
payout activities. Intensity of Covenants refers to the sum of three covenant indicators, with each of the indicators equal to 1 if at least a restrictive
covenant exists in one of the three categories. Trust is the percentage of affirmative responses to the WVS question: Generally speaking, would you say
that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people? Detailed variable definitions are provided in Online
Appendix Table IA1.

Table 2 Effect of trust on the use of debt covenants.

Number of covenants
All

All

(1)
Panel A: Results of Poisson regressions
Trust
-0.516
(0.158)
Issue-level controls
Amount
Maturity
Orthogonalized Rating
Firm-level controls
Size
Leverage
Interest Coverage
Profitability
Capital Expenditure
Tangibility
Country-level controls
GDP

Intensity of
covenants
All

(2)

Restrictions on
financing
(3)

Restrictions on
investment
(4)

Restrictions
on payouts
(5)

-0.574
(0.194)

-0.476
(0.263)

-0.576
(0.238)

-2.106
(1.292)

-0.420
(0.155)

0.006
(0.015)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.020
(0.015)

0.020
(0.014)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.034
(0.023)

0.007
(0.019)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.012
(0.016)

-0.065
(0.038)
-0.000
(0.000)
-0.141
(0.063)

0.014
(0.015)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.019
(0.013)

-0.085
(0.020)
0.538
(0.152)
0.004
(0.003)
-0.114
(0.317)
0.058
(0.242)
0.441
(0.227)

-0.109
(0.035)
0.410
(0.112)
0.000
(0.000)
0.694
(0.445)
-0.004
(0.400)
0.700
(0.402)

-0.025
(0.016)
0.400
(0.161)
0.004
(0.002)
-0.289
(0.258)
0.224
(0.153)
0.282
(0.170)

-0.294
(0.132)
1.545
(0.604)
0.010
(0.006)
-2.131
(1.261)
0.360
(0.514)
0.011
(0.550)

-0.037
(0.024)
0.597
(0.134)
0.003
(0.002)
-0.076
(0.262)
0.375
(0.196)
0.552
(0.208)

-0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

(6)
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Table 2 (Continued)

Number of covenants
All

All

(1)

1.362
(0.055)
No
944
1

GDP Growth
Financial Development
Inflation
Creditor Rights
Rule of Law
Control of Corruption
Constant
Industry and year dummies
Observations
VIF

(2)

Restrictions on
financing
(3)

Restrictions on
investment
(4)

Restrictions
on payouts
(5)

-0.016
(0.012)
-0.003
(0.001)
0.011
(0.006)
-0.072
(0.026)
0.149
(0.177)
0.131
(0.142)
1.783
(0.328)
Yes
934
7.57

-0.005
(0.022)
-0.003
(0.001)
0.004
(0.008)
-0.104
(0.034)
0.217
(0.207)
-0.063
(0.162)
-0.002
(0.414)
Yes
934
7.57

-0.016
(0.009)
-0.002
(0.001)
0.018
(0.006)
-0.048
(0.020)
0.071
(0.139)
0.262
(0.112)
0.833
(0.223)
Yes
934
7.57

-0.091
(0.045)
-0.007
(0.003)
-0.003
(0.025)
-0.164
(0.067)
0.305
(0.678)
0.576
(0.468)
-12.021
(1.715)
Yes
934
7.57

Number of covenants
All

All

(1)

(2)

Restrictions
on financing
(3)

Panel B: Results of three-level random coefficient Poisson regressions
Trust
-1.785
-2.584
-1.860
(0.793)
(0.979)
(1.088)
Issue-level controls
Amount
-0.004
0.028
(0.031)
(0.031)
Maturity
0.000
0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
Orthogonalized Rating
-0.011
-0.008
(0.015)
(0.024)
Firm-level controls
Size
-0.017
-0.108
(0.025)
(0.042)
Leverage
0.922
0.508
(0.362)
(0.151)
Interest Coverage
0.009
0.001
(0.004)
(0.003)
Profitability
-0.157
0.236
(0.462)
(0.429)
Capital Expenditure
0.456
0.085
(0.374)
(0.447)
Tangibility
0.122
0.255
(0.260)
(0.304)
Country-level controls
GDP
0.000
0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
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Intensity of
covenants
All
(6)
-0.022
(0.010)
-0.002
(0.001)
0.004
(0.005)
-0.060
(0.021)
0.064
(0.123)
0.121
(0.098)
0.421
(0.239)
Yes
934
7.57
Intensity of
covenants
All

Restrictions on
investment
(4)

Restrictions on
payouts
(5)

-0.995
(0.655)

-2.887
(1.223)

-1.647
(0.729)

0.034
(0.033)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.012
(0.022)

-0.108
(0.074)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.169
(0.043)

0.013
(0.019)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.015
(0.019)

0.022
(0.020)
0.310
(0.218)
0.005
(0.003)
0.233
(0.803)
2.137
(1.113)
0.163
(0.296)

-0.293
(0.094)
1.905
(0.492)
0.016
(0.006)
-3.781
(1.308)
-0.980
(1.661)
-0.465
(0.435)

-0.039
(0.036)
0.525
(0.120)
0.003
(0.002)
-0.089
(0.445)
0.639
(0.326)
0.311
(0.230)

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

(6)
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Table 2 (Continued)

Number of covenants
All

All

(1)

(2)

Restrictions
on financing
(3)

Restrictions on
investment
(4)

Restrictions on
payouts
(5)

1.061
(0.484)
No
944
0.998

-0.016
(0.021)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.031
(0.006)
-0.040
(0.080)
0.248
(0.413)
0.265
(0.298)
1.585
(0.666)
Yes
934
0.838

0.026
(0.022)
-0.001
(0.002)
0.027
(0.009)
0.131
(0.056)
3.282
(0.912)
-0.960
(0.338)
-1.412
(1.095)
Yes
934
0.885

-0.002
(0.014)
0.001
(0.001)
0.050
(0.013)
-0.132
(0.047)
0.144
(0.351)
0.345
(0.254)
-0.667
(0.402)
Yes
934
0.946

-0.107
(0.075)
-0.002
(0.003)
0.019
(0.016)
-0.170
(0.131)
-0.259
(0.648)
0.604
(0.549)
3.103
(2.015)
Yes
934
0.743

0.017
(0.013)
-0.001
(0.003)
0.023
(0.006)
-0.089
(0.049)
1.325
(1.205)
-0.206
(0.438)
0.075
(1.071)
Yes
934
0.930

1

0.998

0.998

0.999

0.963

0.999

1

7.57

7.57

7.57

7.57

7.57

GDP Growth
Financial Development
Inflation
Creditor Rights
Rule of Law
Control of Corruption
Constant
Industry and year dummies
Observations
Unobserved variability
between countries
Unobserved variability between
firms within each country
VIF

Intensity of
covenants
All
(6)

This table presents the main evidence on the relationship between trust and debt covenants using Poisson regressions (Panel A) and a three-level
random coefficient Poisson model (Panel B). Number of Covenants refers to the total number of restrictive covenants based on three categories, namely,
restrictions on a firm’s financing, investment, and payout activities. Intensity of Covenants refers to the sum of three covenant indicators, with each of the
indicators equal to 1 if at least a restrictive covenant exists in one of the three categories. Trust is the mean percentage of affirmative responses to the
WVS question: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people? Additional
variable definitions are provided in Online Appendix Table IA1. Models 1 to 5 present our main evidence on the relationship between Trust and Number
of Covenants. Model 6 reports the relationship between Trust and Intensity of Covenants. The sample consists of foreign bonds issued in the U.S. (Yankee
bonds) contained in the FISD. The merged data cover 934 bond issues from 31 countries over the 1989–2014 period. Standard errors, reported in
parentheses, are clustered at the country level.

both the number (a1 = 1.785; p = 0.024) (Model 1)
and intensity of covenants (a1 = 1.647; p = 0.024)
(Model 6). This effect is economically significant: a
one-standard-deviation increase in Trust around its
mean leads to an average decrease in the number of
covenants of 0.68. These findings reinforce those
reported in Panel A, and provide further support for
Hypothesis 1. We find that the unobserved variability between countries is slightly less than (but
approximately the same size as) the unobserved
variability between firms within each country.
These results suggest that country-level characteristics are as important as firm-level characteristics
in determining debt contracting.
Overall, the results in Table 2 support Hypothesis
1, thereby confirming that social trust significantly
affects debt contracting by reducing the number

(and intensity) of debt covenants. These results also
suggest that, since a high level of trust alleviates the
need for restrictive bond covenants, these can act as
a substitute mechanism for trust in firms operating
in low-trust environments.22

Cross-Country Variation in the Effects of Trust
on Debt Covenants
In this section, we examine cross-country variation
in the relationship between social trust and debt
covenants. Specifically, in Eq. (2), we test whether
our main finding (i.e., a higher level of social trust
reduces the use of debt covenants) is more pronounced in countries with high agency costs (e.g.,
Bae, Kang, & Kim, 2002; Dyck, Volchkova, &
Zingales, 2008; Johnson, Boone, Breach, & Friedman, 2000; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, &
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1.022
(0.446)
-0.444
(0.198)
-5.415
(2.115)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
934
7.66

(3)

Efficient
Judiciary

Panel B: Interaction between trust and political institutions
Trust 9
0.033
0.965
Interaction
(0.016)
(0.462)
variable
Interaction
-0.015
-0.256
variable
(0.005)
(0.215)
Trust
-3.160
-1.801
(1.295)
(0.606)
Issue-level controls
Yes
Yes
Firm-level controls
Yes
Yes
Country-level
Yes
Yes
controls
Industry and year
Yes
Yes
dummies
Observations
893
934
VIF
6.40
5.08

Voice and
Accountability
(WGI)
(2)

0.773
(0.401)
-0.235
(0.174)
-2.088
(0.874)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
934
4.99

(5)

Control of
Corruption

-0.018
(0.004)
-2.717
(0.748)
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.055
(0.220)
-1.658
(0.633)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
934
5.73

-0.201
(0.140)
-1.413
(0.428)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
934
4.09

893
6.40

Yes

0.031
(0.009)

Press
Freedom
(score)
(5)

0.023
(0.009)
0.000
(0.000)
-2.729
(0.812)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
933
5.73

(6)

Debt
Recovery

0.664
(0.353)

Government
Effectiveness
(WGI)
(4)

0.362
(0.150)
-0.117
(0.052)
-3.978
(1.585)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
934
9.20

(4)

Rule of
Law

0.701
(0.320)

Political
Stability
(WGI)
(3)

Number of covenants

protection
0.047
(0.017)
-0.002
(0.004)
-5.166
(1.484)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
933
5.55

Efficiency
of Debt
Enforcement
(2)

-0.302
(0.191)
-1.242
(0.507)
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.755
(0.372)

934
5.08

Yes

1.168
(0.404)
-0.495
(0.180)
-5.930
(1.877)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
934
7.66

(8)

Efficient
Judiciary

0.298
(0.141)
-0.057
(0.049)
-3.301
(1.467)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
934
9.20

(9)

Rule of
Law

934
4.09

Yes

-0.062
(0.132)
-1.191
(0.373)
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.538
(0.309)

Political
Stability
(WGI)
(7)

Intensity of covenants
Voice and
Accountability
(WGI)
(6)

0.032
(0.013)
-0.001
(0.002)
-3.554
(1.158)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
933
5.55

Efficiency
of Debt
Enforcement
(7)

Intensity of covenants

934
5.73

Yes

0.314
(0.195)
-1.170
(0.574)
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.589
(0.307)

Government
Effectiveness
(WGI)
(8)

0.415
(0.355)
-0.094
(0.165)
-1.218
(0.725)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
934
4.99

(10)

Control of
Corruption
Does social trust affect international contracting?

Press
Freedom
(score)
(1)

Panel A: Interaction between trust and investor
Trust 9 Interaction variable
0.040
(0.013)
Interaction variable
-0.001
(0.003)
Trust
-4.423
(1.114)
Issue-level controls
Yes
Firm-level controls
Yes
Country-level controls
Yes
Industry and year dummies
Yes
Observations
933
VIF
5.73

(1)

Debt
Recovery

Number of covenants
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Intragroup
Tax
(1)
(2)

Consolidation

Prevalence of
Family Group
(3)

Number of covenants

-0.075
(0.028)
0.013
(0.007)
0.704
(0.409)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
929
4.44

Prevalence of
Business Group
(4)
0.326
(0.198)
-0.073
(0.045)
-1.509
(0.677)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
929
5.70

Intragroup
Tax
(5)

-2.017
(0.913)
0.439
(0.236)
-0.340
(0.146)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
929
4.28

(6)

Consolidation

-0.057
(0.027)
0.008
(0.007)
0.308
(0.346)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
929
4.19

Prevalence of
Family Group
(7)

Intensity of covenants

-0.049
(0.025)
0.009
(0.005)
0.452
(0.443)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
929
4.44

Prevalence of
Business Group
(8)

This table presents the cross-country variation in the effect of trust on debt covenants using Poisson regressions. Number of Covenants refers to the total number of restrictive covenants based on
three categories, namely, restrictions on a firm’s financing, investment, and payout activities. Intensity of Covenants refers to the sum of three covenant indicators, with each of the indicators equal to
1 if at least a restrictive covenant exists in one of the three categories. Trust is the mean percentage of affirmative responses to the WVS question: Generally speaking, would you say that most people
can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people? Additional variable definitions are provided in Online Appendix Table IA1. Panel A shows the interaction between trust and
investor protection. Panel B shows the interaction between trust and political institutions. Panel C shows the interaction between trust and interlocking business groups. The sample consists of
foreign bonds issued in the U.S. (Yankee bonds) contained in the FISD. The merged data cover 934 bond issues from 31 countries over the 1989–2014 period. Standard errors, reported in
parentheses, are clustered at the country level.

Panel C: Interaction between trust and interlocking business groups
Trust 9 Interaction variable
0.634
-2.427
-0.091
(0.294)
(1.118)
(0.037)
Interaction variable
-0.148
0.441
0.016
(0.074)
(0.286)
(0.008)
Trust
-2.640
-0.471
0.543
(1.031)
(0.194)
(0.372)
Issue-level controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm-level controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Country-level controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry and year dummies
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
929
929
929
VIF
5.70
4.28
4.19

Table 3 continued
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Vishny, 1997, 1998), where we capture agency costs
using the strength of investor protection, the
political environment, and the presence of interlocking business groups. Hypothesis 2 predicts
significant substitution effects between social trust
and these country-level institutions in determining
the number (and intensity) of debt covenants.
Covenantsj;f ;i;c;t ¼ k0 þ k1 Trustc;t1  country
 level institutionsc;t1 þ k2 Trustc;t1 þ k3 country
 level institutionsc;t1 þ k4 ILVj;t þ k5 FLVf ;t1
þ k6 CLVc;t1 þ lt þ li þ ej;f ;i;c;t
ð2Þ

Investor protection
The seminal work of La Porta et al. (1997, 1998)
documents substantial cross-country variation in
the legal protection of investors. Johnson et al.
(2000) and Dyck and Zingales (2004) further show
that private benefits of control are greater in countries with weaker legal protection of investors. We
capture the strength of investor protection in a
country using five measures. Debt Recovery (Djankov,
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008b) is the
recovery rate of secured creditors; higher recovery
rates indicate better creditor protection. Efficiency of
Debt Enforcement (Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, & Shleifer, 2008a) is the present value of the terminal value
of the firm upon bankruptcy; higher values suggest
greater bankruptcy procedure efficiency. Efficient
Judiciary (Djankov et al., 2008a) is the logarithm of
the number of days needed for the judiciary to
collect on a bounced check. Rule of Law is an index
that captures perceptions of the degree to which
people have confidence in and abide by the rules of
society, particularly the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as
well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Finally,
Control of Corruption is an index that captures
perceptions of the degree to which public power is
exercised to benefit private interests, including petty
and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘‘capture’’
of the state by elites. Online Appendix Table IA1
provides further details on these variables.
In Panel A of Table 3, we examine the interaction
between these measures of investor protections and
Trust. In Models 1–5, we regress Number of Covenants on Trust, the investor protection variables,
the interactions between the investor protection
variables and Trust, and the control variables. The
coefficients on the interaction terms are positive
and significant, which suggests that, in line with
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Hypothesis 2, investors rely more on social trust in
countries where investor protection is weak. In
Models 6–10, we repeat this analysis after replacing
the dependent variable with Intensity of Covenants.
The results are qualitatively unchanged, which
provides additional evidence in support of the
effect of social trust being more pronounced in
countries with a weak formal institutional
environment.
To better isolate the moderating effect of the
investor protection variables, we interact Trust with
the residuals from regressing each investor protection variable on Trust, and present the results in
Online Appendix Table IA4. We find that the
interaction terms between all of the orthogonalized
investor protection variables (except for Control of
Corruption) and Trust are positive and significant at
the 5% level or better. These coefficients indicate
that the relationship between social trust and the
use of restrictive covenants is weakened when
country-level formal institutions are stronger, consistent with Hypothesis 2.

Political institutions
A country’s political environment can also influence firms’ agency costs (Qi et al., 2010). For
instance, if the media can be easily influenced by
political pressure, expropriation activities may be
more easily concealed from the public, whereas
independent media can increase the costs of diverting firm resources (Dyck et al., 2008) and discourage corporate fraud (Dyck, Morse, & Zingales, 2010;
Miller, 2006). In addition, a large literature shows
that political interference in corporate decisionmaking, including in state-owned enterprises and
politically connected firms, can lead to expropriation at the cost of minority shareholders’ interests
(Boubakri, Cosset, & Saffar, 2008; Chen, El Ghoul,
Guedhami, & Nash, 2018; Faccio, Masulis, &
McConnell, 2006; Megginson & Netter, 2001).
To examine the influence of political institutions, we first use Press Freedom, an index that
assesses the degree of print, broadcast, and Internet
media independence; we adjust this index so that a
higher score represents a higher level of press
freedom. Next, we use Kaufmann, Kraay, and
Mastruzzi’s (2011) Voice and Accountability, which
measures the perceived degree to which a country’s
citizens can participate in selecting their government as well as their freedom of expression and
association, and Political Stability, which measures
the perceived likelihood that the government will
be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional
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or violent means (e.g., politically motivated violence and terrorism). Finally, we employ Government Effectiveness, which measures the perceived
degree of government effectiveness, including the
quality of public services, quality of the civil
service, degree of independence from political
pressure, and quality of policy design and
implementation.
In Panel B of Table 3, we run an analysis similar
to that in Panel A but we use the political institution measures above rather than the investor
protection measures. Consistent with the results
in Panel A, we find that the interaction terms are
positive and statistically significant, which further
supports Hypothesis 2 by showing that the effect of
social trust on the use of debt covenants is significantly influenced by the country-level political
environment. Specifically, country-level formal
institutions attenuate the relationship between
social trust and the use of restrictive covenants.

Interlocking business groups
Prior research suggests that business groups, and
particularly family groups, are associated with
private benefits of control due to the divergence
of cash flow and control rights (Bae et al., 2002;
Johnson et al., 2000; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999). Bae et al. (2002), for
instance, argue that the wedge between cash flow
and control rights can lead to intragroup transactions within a business group that result in wealth
transfers from a firm for the benefit of its controlling shareholders.23 Such transactions are referred
to as tunneling. Consistent with creditors’ higher
expropriation risk under a business group structure,
Boubakri and Ghouma (2010) and Lin, Ma, Malatesta, and Xuan (2011) find that the agency costs
embedded in business groups are associated with
higher costs of debt financing.
To capture the degree of intragroup tunneling
among business groups, we employ four measures
that come from Masulis, Pham, and Zein (2011).
Intragroup Tax captures the extent to which a
country’s tax law regulates intragroup transactions.
Consolidation is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a
parent firm can consolidate its subsidiary with an
ownership stake of less than 90%, and 0 otherwise.
Prevalence of Family Group is the percentage of total
market capitalization held by firms that belong to a
family group. Prevalence of Business Group is the
percentage of total market capitalization held by
firms that belong to a business group, including

family and non-family business groups. Online
Appendix Table IA1 provides further details on
these variables.
In Panel C of Table 3, we re-run the analysis in
Panels A and B using the four business group
measures rather than the investor protection and
political institutions variables. The interaction
terms have positive loadings on Intragroup Tax
and negative loadings on Consolidation, Prevalence
of Family Group, and Prevalence of Business Group.
Thus, consistent with Hypothesis 2, the results
show that the effect of social trust on debt
contracting is more pronounced in the presence
of interlocking business groups. Our business group
results in Panel C represent an intermittent or
transition stage between country-level formal institutions and firm-level governance structures. While
business group membership is a firm-level measure,
the degree to which business groups dominate the
national ownership structure is a country-level
formal institutional characteristic.

Cross-Firm Variation in the Effect of Trust on Debt
Covenants
In this section, we shift focus from formal countrylevel factors (i.e., Hypothesis 2) to firm-level factors
(i.e., Hypothesis 3) that influence the relationship
between trust and the use of restrictive covenants.
More specifically, we test the following model:
Covenantsj;f ;i;c;t ¼ p0 þ p1 Trustc;t1  firm
 level factorsf ;t1 þ p2 Trustc;t1
þ p3 firm  level factorsf ;t1 þ p4 ILVj;t

ð3Þ

þ p5 FLVf ;t1 þ p6 CLVc;t1 þ lt þ li þ ej;f ;i;c;t :
We use three measures to capture the quality of
firm-level governance and information asymmetry:
Corporate Governance, a composite index created by
ASSET4 that assesses a company’s ability to create
incentives as well as checks and balances to
enhance long-term shareholder value; Error, the
percentage forecast error, which is equal to the
percentage difference between actual and forecasted earnings per share; and R&D, the ratio of
research and development expense over total sales.
Hypothesis 3 predicts significant substitution
effects between social trust and firm-level corporate
governance and information asymmetry in determining the number (and intensity) of covenants.
Table 4 presents regression results on the influence of firm-level corporate governance and information asymmetry on the relationship between
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Table 4 Cross-firm variation in the effect of trust on the use of debt covenants.

Number of covenants

Trust 9 Interaction variable
Interaction variable
Trust
Issue-level controls
Firm-level controls
Country-level controls
Industry and year dummies
Observations
VIF

Intensity of covenants

Corporate
governance
(1)

Error

R&D

Error

R&D

(3)

Corporate
governance
(4)

(2)

(5)

(6)

0.025
(0.012)
-0.012
(0.004)
-3.253
(0.894)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
329
7.07

-0.046
(0.015)
0.030
(0.009)
0.778
(2.358)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
115
32.51

-10.354
(5.658)
3.689
(1.911)
-0.207
(0.265)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
931
4.02

0.026
(0.013)
-0.009
(0.004)
-2.730
(1.235)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
329
7.07

-0.031
(0.009)
0.020
(0.006)
4.042
(2.392)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
115
32.51

-14.894
(7.599)
5.261
(2.542)
0.047
(0.362)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
931
25.9

This table presents the cross-firm variation in the effect of trust on debt covenants using Poisson regressions. Number of Covenants refers to the total
number of restrictive covenants based on three categories, namely, restrictions on a firm’s financing, investment, and payout activities. Intensity of
Covenants refers to the sum of three covenant indicators, with each of the indicators equal to 1 if at least a restrictive covenant exists in one of the three
categories. Trust is the mean percentage of affirmative responses to the WVS question: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be
trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people? Additional variable definitions are provided in Online Appendix Table IA1. Models
1–3 examine the cross-firm variation in the effect of trust on Number of Covenants. Model 1 shows the interaction between trust and the quality of firmlevel governance. Models 2 and 3 show the interaction between trust and firm-level information asymmetry. Models 4–6 repeat the results of Models
1–3 by replacing the dependent variable with Intensity of Covenants. The sample consists of foreign bonds issued in the U.S. (Yankee bonds) contained in
the FISD. The merged data cover 934 bond issues from 31 countries over the 1989–2014 period. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered
at the country level.

social trust and the use of debt covenants. We use
Number of Covenants as the dependent variable in
Models 2 and 3, and Intensity of Covenants in Models
5 and 6. In line with Hypothesis 3, the coefficients
on the interaction terms are consistently statistically significant with the expected signs, which
shows that stronger corporate governance and
lower information asymmetry can compensate for
low levels of social trust.
Taken together, the results in Tables 3 and 4
show that country-level formal institutions and
firm-level governance and transparency can substitute for social trust. These results suggest that while
it may be difficult if not impossible to reduce the
use of restrictive covenants by improving social
trust within a country, policymakers and firm
managers can achieve this aim through improvements to formal institutions and governance structures and information asymmetry, respectively.

Endogeneity
Reverse causality is unlikely to explain our results
because, as Williamson (2000) argues, transactionlevel outcomes (i.e., the use of debt covenants) are
unlikely to influence a country’s informal institution (i.e., social trust). It is possible that an omitted
variable can simultaneously influence social trust
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and the use of debt covenants, leading to a spurious
relationship between the two. In this section, we
conduct a two-stage least squares (2SLS) analysis to
further alleviate concerns about endogeneity that
may undermine the inference of a causal effect of
social trust on the use of debt covenants.
To capture the exogenous variations in social
trust, we use three predetermined instrumental
variables motivated by prior research.24 The first is
Tropical, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country
is in a tropical climate zone, and 0 otherwise (Beck,
Demirgüç-Kunt, & Levine, 2003). The motivation
for this variable is that a country’s climate can
affect its level of social trust. As Bjørnskov and
Méon (2013) point out, survival through winters in
cold climates was historically dependent on help
from strangers. Therefore, the extension of trust
towards unfamiliar people was an evolutionary
strategy in cold countries, such as those in Scandinavia. The second instrument, Genetic Distance,
measures the genetic distance between the population of one country and that of the U.S. (where
Yankee bonds are issued). This instrument, which is
obtained from Spolaore & Wacziarg (2009), measures the probability that random selection by two
alleles at a given locus from the population of one
country and the population of the U.S. will be
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Table 5 Endogeneity.

First stage
(1)
Trust
Instruments
Tropical
Genetic Distance
2nd Person Differentiation
Issue-level controls
Firm-level controls
Country-level controls
Industry and year dummies
Observations
First stage F statistic
overid Hansen’s J statistic
Overid p value
VIF

-0.087
(0.033)
-0.001
(0.000)
-0.070
(0.008)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
879
56.06
–
–
14.46

Second stage
Number of covenants
(2)

Intensity of covenants
(3)

-2.422
(0.856)

-1.756
(0.691)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
879

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
879

2.08
0.35
11.18

1.23
0.54
11.18

This table presents the 2SLS regressions examining the effect of trust on debt covenants. Number of Covenants refers to the total number of restrictive
covenants based on three categories, namely, restrictions on a firm’s financing, investment, and payout activities. Intensity of Covenants refers to the sum
of three covenant indicators, with each of the indicators equal to 1 if at least a restrictive covenant exists in one of the three categories. Trust is the mean
percentage of affirmative responses to the WVS question: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be
very careful in dealing with people? Tropical is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is in a tropical climate zone, and 0 otherwise. Genetic Distance
is the genetic distance between the population of one country and that of the U.S. 2nd Person Differentiation is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
number of second person pronouns used in spoken language differs by the type of person with whom one interacts, and 0 otherwise. Additional
variable definitions are provided in Online Appendix Table IA1. The first-stage regression is reported in Model 1. Models 2 and 3 report the second-stage
regressions using the fitted values of Trust. The sample consists of foreign bonds issued in the U.S. (Yankee bonds) contained in the FISD. The merged
data cover 934 bond issues from 31 countries over the 1989–2014 period. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the country level.

different.25 Genetic distance between two populations is a reflection of their common linguistic and
cultural roots. Therefore, genetically similar countries should exhibit higher levels of trust (Guiso
et al., 2009). The third instrument is the 2nd Person
Differentiation, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
number of second person pronouns used in spoken
language differs by the type of person with whom
one interacts, and 0 otherwise. Tabellini (2008)
argues that the structure of language, in particular
its specific grammatical rules, can exert an independent causal effect on concept formation and
cultural traits, including trust and respect. Specifically, some languages use multiple personal pronouns according to the type of interpersonal
relationship between speakers, whereas others do
not differentiate. The distinction between personal
pronouns is associated with a hierarchy of power
and social distance, and therefore reflects less
respect for the individual and greater individual
mistrust.26 Accordingly, a country exhibiting a
greater variation in the use of second person

pronouns is associated with a lower level of trust.
In general, we expect trust to be negatively associated with Tropical, Genetic Distance, and 2nd Person
Differentiation.
Table 5 reports the results of 2SLS regressions
using these three instruments. In Model 1, we
report the results from the first-stage regression in
which the dependent variable is Trust. Overall, we
find that our instruments are significantly correlated with Trust, as expected. More specifically,
Tropical, Genetic Distance, and 2nd Person Differentiation are associated with lower levels of trust. These
results suggest that our instruments satisfy the
relevance requirement. The relevance of our instruments finds further support from the first-stage
F statistic of 56.06, which is well above the threshold value of 10.
In Models 2 and 3 of Table 5, we report results
from second-stage regressions of debt covenant use
on social trust. We find significantly negative coefficients of -2.422 (number of covenants, Model 2)
and -1.756 (intensity of covenants, Model 3) on
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Trust, thus confirming that creditors demand fewer
restrictive covenants from firms domiciled in countries with a high level of trust (after controlling for
endogeneity). The bottom of Table 5 reports the
results of Hansen’s (1982) over-identification test for
the null hypothesis that our instrumental variables
are exogenous. We find that the p values exceed 10%
in both Model 2 and Model 3, which suggests that
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. In general,
our main findings continue to hold after addressing
endogeneity concerns, and the results based on this
instrumental variable approach are consistent with
earlier results based on non-instrumental variable
approaches.

Out-of-Sample Evidence
Although our cross-country setting allows us to
examine the effects of social trust on debt contracting across a wide variety of societies, it is also
susceptible to concerns about potential omitted
country-specific traits. We further mitigate this
concern by performing an out-of-sample analysis
using covenants in public corporate bonds issued
within a single-country setting (i.e., by U.S. companies operating in the United States). In addition
to providing out-of-sample evidence, the use of U.S.
bond covenants helps to alleviate any concerns
about omitted country-level variables, since these
U.S. firms share a similar formal institutional (e.g.,
political, legal, social, and economic) environment.
Following our main analysis, we use WVS to
construct Trust US at the U.S. region level. Consistent with our baseline model, we control for the
same set of issue- and firm-level variables. We
replace the country-level control variables with
state-level variables; namely, State GDP (logarithm
of the state-level GDP per capita) and State GDP
Growth (growth of the state-level GDP per capita).
The state-level GDP information is collected from
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level.27
Online Appendix Table IA5 reports the results.
Reinforcing our main evidence, we find that Trust
US loads negatively and significantly on both the
Number of Covenants and the Intensity of Covenants,
thereby alleviating any concerns that omitted
country-level characteristics are driving the documented relationship between trust and the use of
debt covenants.
Robustness Tests
We conduct a series of tests to check the robustness
of our main findings. Specifically, we examine
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whether our main findings continue to hold after
considering alternative proxies, explanations, samples, and empirical methods.
We begin by examining whether our results are
sensitive to using two alternative measures of Trust.
The first measure is based on the formula 100 + (%
of WVS participants who respond ‘‘most people can
be trusted’’) - (% of WVS participants who respond
‘‘can’t be too careful’’) (Pevzner et al., 2015). The
second measure is the country-year average of a
rescaled response to the WVS question ‘‘Do you
trust your neighborhood completely, somewhat,
not very much, or not at all?’’ The results are
reported in Panel A of Online Appendix Table IA6.
We find that social trust continues to have a
negative and significant effect on both Number of
Covenants and Intensity of Covenants, which demonstrates that our main results are robust to using
alternative proxies for Trust.
Next, we examine whether alternative stories can
explain the relationship between social trust and
the use of debt covenants. One could argue that
trust is a manifestation of cultural values, and that
these (non-trust) cultural values are the real factors
that drive the relationship we document. We
investigate this possibility in Panel B of Online
Appendix Table IA6, where we add various proxies
for (non-trust) cultural values to our baseline
regression using Number of Covenants. Our first set
of tests employs Hofstede’s (2001) cultural dimensions (individualism, uncertainty avoidance, power
distance, and masculinity), which are widely used
in studies of cross-cultural values (e.g., Karolyi,
2016). Models 1–4 consider these four dimensions
separately, while Model 5 runs a horserace on all
four of Hofstede’s dimensions. We find that the
loadings on Hofstede’s (2001) cultural dimensions
are insignificant, suggesting that (non-trust) cultural values as captured by Hofstede (2001) cannot
explain the effect of social trust on the use of debt
covenants that we document. In contrast, Trust
continues to load significantly negatively in all
specifications, in line with our earlier results. In
Models 6 to 8 we employ the embeddedness and
mastery measures of Schwartz (1994). Model 9
considers the power distance, institutional collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, and assertiveness
measures of House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, and
Gupta (2004), which are based on the GLOBE
database. In Model 10, we use the tightness measure of Gelfand et al. (2011). Results of these
additional tests are qualitatively similar to our
main findings. When we repeat these tests after
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replacing Number of Covenants with Intensity of
Covenants (Models 11–20), we again find that the
results are qualitatively similar to our main findings. We therefore find strong evidence that (nontrust) cultural values cannot explain the relationship between social trust and the use of debt
covenants that we document.28
We also test whether the results hold after
controlling for a firm’s previous issuance of Yankee
bonds and the issuer’s home country foreign direct
investment in the U.S. The idea is that prior local
issuing of bonds and the degree of foreign direct
investment may make a firm appear credible, thus
lowering the likelihood of bond covenants. We
include two additional controls in Panel C. The
first, Active Previous Bonds, is dummy variable equal
to 1 if a firm has an active Yankee bond issued prior
to the focal bond. The second, FDI/GDP, is the
foreign direct investment stock from the issuer’s
home county in the U.S. scaled by the issuer’s
home country GDP. The results, reported in Panel
C of Online Appendix Table IA6, suggest that our
inferences on the role of Trust are not affected by
including these additional controls.
We also consider alternative samples. Focusing
on our initial sample of Yankee bonds, we note
that, similar to other studies of Yankee bonds (e.g.,
Miller & Puthenpurackal, 2002; Qi et al., 2011), our
sample is unbalanced. Some countries account for a
large percentage of our sample: for instance,
Canada (36.40%) and the UK (20.43%), while
Colombia (0.10%), India (0.10%), and Indonesia
(0.10%) account for a small percentage. To examine
whether our main findings could be driven by
sample composition bias, we re-estimate our baseline regressions after excluding Canadian firms
(Models 1 and 5), British firms (Models 2 and 6),
firms from Canada and the UK (Models 3 and 7),
and firms from countries with no more than five
observations (Models 4 and 8). The results, reported
in Panel D of Online Appendix Table IA6, continue
to show significant negative loadings on Trust,
mitigating concerns about sample composition
bias.
Finally, we employ alternative empirical methods. The use of country fixed effects can mitigate
the influence of time-invariant country-level unobserved variables. However, our regressions above do
not include country fixed effects because Trust
varies little over time. As Wooldridge (2002: 286)
points out, fixed effects can generate imprecise
estimates for explanatory variables that are relatively stable over time. Nevertheless, in Models 1

and 3 of Panel D, we re-run our baseline model after
including country fixed effects. We find that Trust
loads with a negative and significant coefficient in
both models, consistent with our main findings.
We also re-run our baseline specification using a
negative binomial regression—an alternative
approach to estimating count variables—rather
than a Poisson regression. As can be seen in Models
2 and 4 of Panel E, the coefficients on Trust are
negative and significant at the 1% and 5% levels,
respectively, which shows that our main results do
not depend on the choice of estimation method.

The Pricing Effect of Covenants
In this section, we test our final hypothesis,
Hypothesis 4, which holds that social trust reduces
borrowing costs by reducing agency and information problems (direct effect) and by reducing the
use of debt covenants (indirect effect).
We test Hypothesis 4 using two specifications.
We first regress Yankee bond interest rates on
maturity-matched Treasury rates (i.e., Treasury
spreads) on social trust and our set of control
variables. In the second regression, we re-run this
model after adding an interaction term between
social trust and a debt covenants indicator.
Hypothesis 4 predicts that higher levels of social
trust will have a less favorable impact on borrowing
costs when covenants are added to the debt contract (i.e., debt covenants substitute for social trust
in countries where social trust is low).
To test Hypothesis 4, we employ the treatmenteffects model of Greene (2000) to examine the
pricing effects of Yankee bond covenants and social
trust (particularly for low-trust countries) on the
issuing firm’s cost of debt. Following Miller and
Reisel (2012), our treatment-effects model comprises a system of two equations: a covenant
selection equation (Eq. (4)) and a bond pricing
equation (Eq. (5)). Note that both covenant selection and bond pricing can be endogenously determined. The treatment-effects model mitigates this
concern by simultaneously estimating both equations as follows:
Covenantsj;f ;i;c;t ¼ d0 þ d1 Trustc;t1 þ d2 Zj;f ;c;t1 þ lt
þ li þ uj;f ;i;c;t
ð4Þ

Journal of International Business Studies

Does social trust affect international contracting?

Paul Brockman et al.

1036


Bond Spreadj;f ;i;c;t ¼ b0 þ b1 D Covenantsj;f ;t

þ b2 Trustc;t1 þ b3 D Covenantsj;f ;t  Trustc;t1
þ b4 Xj;f ;c;t1 þ lt þ li þ ej;f ;i;c;t ;
ð5Þ
where D(Covenants) is a dummy variable equal to 1
if the debt contract contains a covenant of any
type, and 0 otherwise. In the covenant selection
equation (Eq. (4)), Z is a vector that includes all of
the control variables (i.e., ILV, FLV, and CLV) in our
main model (Eq. (1)) as well as year and industry
indicators. In the bond pricing equation (Eq. (5)),
Bond Spread, or the cost of debt, is the difference
between the bond yield and the benchmark Treasury, and X is a vector that contains bond, firm, and
macroeconomic factors that determine the Bond
Spread: the previously defined Amount, Maturity,
Size, Leverage, Interest Coverage, Profitability, and
Capital Expenditure, as well as Term Spread (the
10-year Treasury rates minus the 2-year Treasury
rate), Credit Spread (the yield spread between Aaaand Bbb-rated corporate bonds), Log Exchange Rate
Volatility (the natural logarithm of exchange rate
volatility), ADR (an indicator of whether a firm has
previously issued an ADR), Secured (an indicator of
whether the security is a secured issue), Subordinated (an indicator of whether the security is a
subordinated issue), Orthogonalized Rating (the
residuals obtained from regressing ratings on
Trust),29 Sinking Fund (an indicator of whether the
issue has a sinking fund), Callable (an indicator of
whether the security issue is callable), and Gross
Spread (the difference between the price received by
the underwriter and the price paid by investors,
which captures bond liquidity). Equations (4) and
(5) also control for year and industry effects.
Table 6 presents results of the pricing equation.
In Model 1, we start by showing the results of
estimating an OLS for the impact of Trust on the
cost of debt. We find that bond-issuing firms from
high-trust countries benefit from lower debt-financing costs (b2 = -114.595; p = 0.019). Economically,
moving Trust by one standard deviation is associated with a 14.90 basis point reduction in the cost
of debt. In Model 2, we estimate the treatment
effects models shown in Eqs. (4) and (5) by
accounting for the independent pricing effects of
D(Covenants) and Trust. We find that D(Covenants)
(b1 = -70.542; p = 0.001) and Trust (b2 = -144.750;
p = 0) load negatively. Economically, we find that
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the presence of covenants is associated with a 70.54
basis point reduction in Bond Spread. If we increase
Trust by one standard deviation, Bond Spread
decreases by 18.82 basis points. These results confirm our prediction that restrictive covenants and
social trust are priced by investors. When we
compare our results to those of Miller and Reisel
(2012),30 who also show that Creditor Rights is
priced by investors, we find that the effect of
Creditor Rights is significantly lower when Trust is
included in the pricing effect model. This suggests
that the pricing effect of Creditor Rights is subsumed
by Trust; that is, investors may weigh the level of
social trust more heavily than the extent of legal
protections when pricing debt. Thus, consistent
with Williamson’s (2000) hierarchical model, we
find that social trust has greater influence on
transaction prices than does creditor rights.
Next, we investigate the interaction effects of
D(Covenants) and Trust on the cost of debt. If both
debt covenants and social trust can reduce managerial opportunism, the protection provided by
covenants should be more valuable when the level
of social trust is low. Consistent with this conjecture, Model 3 shows that the coefficient on the
interaction between D(Covenants) and Trust is positive and significant (b3 = 166.341; p = 0.044), with
an impact level of 166.34. Economically speaking,
by moving from a country with a trust value half a
standard deviation above the mean to a country
with a trust value half a standard deviation below
the mean, the presence of covenants can reduce the
cost of debt by 21.62 basis points. In extreme cases,
such as Norway (the country with highest level of
trust in our sample), the presence of covenants
reduces the cost of debt by 44.38 basis points, while
in Peru (the country with lowest level of trust in our
sample), the presence of covenants can reduce the
cost of debt by 117.74 basis points.
Overall, the results in this section improve our
understanding of the pricing of debt contracts.
High levels of social trust at the country level, as
well as the use of debt covenants at the firm level,
can reduce a firm’s cost of debt. More importantly,
we show that the role of debt covenants in reducing
the cost of debt is more important when the issuing
firm is located in a country with a low level of social
trust; that is, we show that social trust and debt
covenants act as substitutes in assuring the firm’s
creditors.
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Table 6 Effects of trust on the pricing of covenants.

Dependent variable

Bond spread
OLS
(1)

(2)

(3)

-114.595
(48.972)

-70.542
(20.447)
-144.75
(43.599)

-0.644
(4.954)
9.067
(9.347)
-0.001
(0.002)
-44.623
(7.462)
17.073
(51.736)
0.567
(0.164)
-525.347
(119.942)
510.221
(185.535)
5.279
(17.029)
179.397
(26.656)
-0.978
(3.056)
-5.206
(28.922)
1.246
(20.767)
109.122
(40.717)
-17.191
(6.415)
-130.066
(114.093)
33.193
(14.752)
2.735
(2.242)
389.120
(141.498)
No
708
1

-1.967
(3.934)
23.126
(8.661)
0.001
(0.001)
-22.680
(4.648)
85.539
(30.441)
0.507
(0.116)
-315.224
(74.345)
330.083
(89.453)
-54.442
(7.098)
183.904
(17.977)
1.572
(2.758)
-25.013
(17.995)
10.092
(67.280)
32.445
(73.739)
-11.191
(5.018)
-131.963
(51.750)
22.077
(11.619)
0.463
(1.052)
42.728
(125.671)
Yes
565
–

-131.050
(52.004)
-244.757
(71.987)
166.341
(82.757)
-6.832
(3.733)
-2.940
(7.946)
0.000
(0.000)
-19.247
(4.694)
78.734
(36.283)
0.554
(0.175)
-394.904
(66.933)
565.414
(84.39)
19.008
(63.360)
-21.159
(264.488)
-0.737
(2.377)
-33.701
(16.44)
4.090
(58.429)
79.539
(68.568)
-6.399
(4.571)
-80.905
(53.579)
22.170
(11.141)
1.107
(0.954)
472.892
(441.955)
Yes
605
–

D(Covenants)
Trust

Treatment effect model

D(Covenants) 9 Trust
Creditor Rights
Amount
Maturity
Size
Leverage
Interest Coverage
Profitability
Capital Expenditure
Term Spread
Credit Spread (AAA-BAA)
Log Exchange Rate Volatility
ADR
Secured
Subordinated
Orthogonalized Rating
Sinking Fund
Callable
Gross Spread
Constant
Industry and year dummies
Observations
VIF

This table presents the pricing effect of trust and covenants using OLS and the treatment-effects model of Greene (2000). Bond Spread measures the
difference between the yield of the bond and benchmark Treasury. D(Covenants) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the debt contract contains a covenant
of any type, 0 otherwise. Trust is the mean percentage of affirmative responses to the WVS question: Generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people? Additional variable definitions are provided in Online Appendix
Table IA1. The sample consists of foreign bonds issued in the U.S. (Yankee bonds) contained in the FISD. The merged data cover 934 bond issues from
31 countries over the 1989–2014 period. Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the country level.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Our study investigates how informal institutions
(i.e., social trust) can impact managerial decisionmaking (i.e., debt contracting) within the international business environment. We apply the insights
of rational choice institutionalism (Campbell,
2004; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Ingram & Clay, 2000;
Shepsle, 1989; Weingast, 2002) and Williamson’s
(2000) four-level social structure to examine how
country-level social trust can directly influence the
issuing firm’s use of bond covenants and borrowing
costs. We also investigate whether social trust can
indirectly influence the use of covenants and
borrowing costs through its impact on countrylevel formal institutions and organization-level
governance structures. Building on extant research
suggesting that social trust is a fundamental determinant of economic outcomes (Ahern et al., 2015;
Arrow, 1972; Guiso et al., 2008, 2009), we argue
that a high level of social trust will reduce borrower
opportunism and, therefore, creditor demand for
restrictive covenants.
Using a sample of 934 Yankee bond issues from
31 countries for the period 1989–2014, we find that
firms from high-trust countries issue bonds with
fewer bond covenants. The effect of social trust on
the use of debt covenants is moderated, however,
by the presence of strong formal institutions and
strong firm-level governance mechanisms and
information transparency, suggesting that these
factors can substitute for social trust in influencing
debt contracting. These results are robust to a series
of robustness tests to alleviate concerns about
potential endogeneity, omitted variable bias, and
the use of an unbalanced sample. The results are
also robust to using alternative proxies for social
trust and alternative model specifications. Finally,
we examine the direct and indirect pricing effects
of social trust and find that high social trust is
related to significantly lower borrowing costs, but
this effect is reduced in the presence of covenants.
We conclude that issue-level debt covenants act as
a substitute for social trust in countries where the
level of trust is low.
Our study contributes to the literature on the role
of informal (unstructured) institutions in shaping
the behavior of individuals and organizations,
consistent with the ‘‘choice-within-constraints’’
concept within rational choice institutionalism
(Campbell, 2004). Although this literature has been
growing over the past decade, it is still relatively
small compared to the body of literature that
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examines the effects of formal (structured) institutions on individuals and organizations (Kim et al.,
2017). While our main focus is on the direct effects
of social trust on the debt contracts of international
businesses (i.e., from a cultural attribute to an
economic transaction, our study also produces new
results related to interaction effects between social
trust and various formal institutions such as the
country-level institutional environment and the
firm-level governance structure. We find consistently strong substitution effects between informal
institutions and formal institutions on international debt contracting. Overall, our results provide
a more comprehensive picture of the multilevel
links connecting social trust and international
bond covenants than that found in the previous
literature. In addition, our study contributes indirectly to the related work of Hasan et al. (2017) by
focusing on cross-country variation rather than
within-country variation in social capital. In our
global setting, we are able to examine a rich set of
interactions between social trust and other levels
within Williamson’s (2000) social analysis.
Our study has significant implications for international business managers and government regulators. Williamson’s (2000) social framework makes
it clear that informal institutions (e.g., social trust,
religion, culture) are deeply entwined in the societal fabric. Such institutions change very slowly
over long time horizons, thus making them relatively insusceptible to top–down social engineering. The implication for corporate managers and
government regulators is that, while it is important
to evaluate the level of their society’s social trust,
this level should be taken as a relatively fixed
feature of the surrounding environment. Against
this relatively fixed background, the regulator’s
main task should be to design optimal formal
institutions that protect the legal rights of creditors
and shareholders, and that minimize transaction
costs between financial market participants. Similarly, the manager’s main task should be to design
optimal formal institutions that strengthen the
firm’s corporate governance structures, thereby
reducing agency costs, as well as strengthen formal
institutions that promote financial transparency,
thereby reducing asymmetric information costs.
Although our study is motivated by well-established theories (e.g., rational choice institutionalism, social analysis, principal–agent theory), and
employs widely used datasets and empirical methods, our findings and conclusions remain subject to
limitations. As discussed above, there are potential
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discrepancies between our unit of measurement
and our units of analysis. Our research design treats
firm managers operating in a particular country as
having the same social trust attributes as the overall
country. We also assume that, if citizens of a
particular country possess high (low) levels of social
trust between themselves, then outside creditors
will impute similarly high (low) levels of social trust
to the same country. While there are likely to be
exceptions to this assumption, previous studies
(e.g., Kanagaretnam et al., 2019; Li et al., 2019;
Meng & Yin, 2019) suggest that it is not particularly
onerous. Another potential limitation is the mixing
of individual and organizational trust. While our
main measure of trust is based on an individual-toindividual measure, some actors in our empirical
setting can be organizations (e.g., bond-issuing
firms or bond-purchasing mutual funds).
With these limitations in mind, we believe that
the theoretical framework and empirical findings in
this study not only make significant contributions
to the literature but also suggest several directions
for future research. First, there are other societal
characteristics (e.g., attitudes toward power distance, uncertainty, individualism versus collectivism, indulgence versus restraint) that could be
used to examine what (if any) role they play in
economic transactions (i.e., debt contracting).
Second, in addition to direct effects, future research
could examine the indirect effects of these various
societal characteristics on debt contracting through
their interactions with formal institutions and
corporate governance structures. Third, there are
many other economic transactions and activities
that future research could analyze within the same
multidimensional framework that we develop in
this study. And finally, in addition to economic
activities, future research could apply rational
choice institutionalism within Williamson’s social
framework to examine a broader range of political
and social phenomena.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors thank three anonymous reviewers, Aya
Chacar (Guest Editor), Luis Dau (Guest Editor), JT Li
(Guest Editor), Marjorie Lyles (Guest Editor), Narjess
Boubakri, Nancy Buchan, Ruiyuan Chen, Chuck Kwok,
Kevin J. Maloney (Bryant research seminar discussant),
Sattar Mansi, Gerald McDermott, Peter J. Nigro
(Bryant research seminar discussant), Blake Rayfield
(FMA discussant), Andy Spicer, He Wang, Xiaolan

Zheng, Charles E. Stevens, and participants at the
2018 Academy of International Business annual meeting, the 2019 Financial Management Association
annual meeting, and the 2018 Bryant University
research seminar, for their helpful comments and
suggestions. Sadok El Ghoul acknowledges financial
support from Canada’s Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council [Grant Number 435-2020-1156].

NOTES
1

The use of social trust as an informal institution
to enhance economic outcomes has also been
analyzed in development economics. In the context of Africa’s economic development, for example, Odera (2013: 121) examines how ‘‘trust, framed
as an informal institution, plays an important role
in business operations in the informal sector by
filling the vacuum left by the lack of formal
institutions.’’
2
A related definition of social trust is provided by
Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer (1998: 395):
‘‘Trust is a psychological state comprising the
intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of
another.’’
3
For example, previous studies show that weak
legal environments (Qi, Roth, & Wald, 2011) and
creditor rights (Miller & Reisel, 2012) increase the
use of bond covenants, while weak political rights
(Qi, Roth, & Wald, 2010) and investor protection
(Bae & Goyal, 2009) increase the cost of debt
financing. Relatedly, El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok,
and Zheng (2020) find that creditor rights affect the
costs of high leverage.
4
See https://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2018/01/
16/foreign-companies-flock-to-the-u-s-bondmarket/.
5
See
https://www.wsj.com/articles/petrobrasraises-8-5-billion-from-bond-sale-1394481639.
6
See
https://www.globallegalchronicle.com/
royal-dutch-shells-us4-billion-triple-tranche-bondoffer/.
7
See https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2017-04-23/mizuho-seeks-bigger-presence-in-yankee-bonds-to-boost-fee-income.
8
In contrast to this impersonal aspect of trust,
other studies (e.g., Bidault, de la Torre, Batten,
Zanakis, & Ring, 2018; Cruz, Gómez-Mejia &
Becerra, 2010; Gulati, 1995; Jeffries & Reed, 2000;
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Jones & George, 1998; Luhmann, 1988), examine a
personal aspect of trust that is developed through
repeated personal interactions.
9
Some rational choice institutionalists (e.g.,
Shepsle, 1989) use the terms ‘‘unstructured and
structured’’ institutions when referring to ‘‘informal
and formal’’ institutions, respectively.
10
We compare issue-level and firm-level characteristics of the excluded observations in the sample
construction process to the final sample observations. In unreported results, we find that the
excluded sample has a smaller fraction of callable
bonds, shorter maturity, larger firm size, lower
profitability, and higher tangibility. We do not find
significant differences in leverage, interest rate
coverage, or capital expenditure.
11
Specifically, this measure captures the level of
trust within a particular country. It does not
measure trust across countries (i.e., the level of
trust within one country for another country). As
we argue in our theory section, this commonly
used assumption seems to be appropriate for our
debt contract setting; to the extent that social trust
mitigates opportunistic firm behaviors in debt
contracting, outside creditors will take into consideration the level of within-country social trust.
12
Since trust is deeply embedded in a country’s
social fabric, it should be relatively constant across
time. Consistent with this viewpoint, we find that
the average autocorrelation of trust is 97% for our
sample countries.
13
In a sensitivity check, we also estimate a
negative binomial regression. The results are qualitatively unchanged.
14
We also estimate an extended model that
incorporates additional issue-level controls consisting of the following bond indicator variables:
secured, subordinated, junk, sinking fund, and
callable. The data requirements of this extended
model reduce the sample size by roughly 50%, but
the main findings persist.
15
We obtain the creditor rights index from
Djankov et al. (2007). The data cover the period
1978–2004 and are therefore available for each
individual year over 1989–2004. We use the 2004
value of this index for the period 2005–2014. This
approach is reasonable given the high level of
persistence in the index (Djankov et al., 2007). For
instance, over the period 1989–2004, only 4 of the
31 countries in our sample experience changes of
any kind in the index (i.e., 6 total changes, 2
upward and 4 downward). As a robustness check,
we also use an alternative measure of creditor rights
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from the World Bank’s Doing Business database
covering the period 2004–2014. Because this alternative index starts in 2004 (our sample starts in
1989) and covers 18 of the 31 countries in our
sample, the total number of observations (392)
drops significantly compared to our main sample.
Importantly, our Online Appendix Table IA2 shows
that all our empirical results continue to hold when
we use this alternative proxy for creditor rights.
16
Our main findings persist when we cluster
standard errors at the firm level.
17
In robustness tests, we show that our main
findings hold after excluding countries with an
extremely large or small number of observations
18
In our robustness section, we account for the
correlation between social trust and investor protection variables.
19
Following Meyer, van Witteloostuijn, and
Beugelsdijk (2017), we report standard errors in
the tables and p values in the text.
20
When we address endogeneity below, the economic impact of Trust becomes stronger than that
of Creditor Rights.
21
We replicate Table 4 in Miller and Reisel (2012).
Following their study, we restrict the sample to
bonds issued from 1989 through the first quarter of
2006. We have 745 observations while Miller and
Reisel (2012) have 697 observations. Similar to their
findings, we show that creditor rights significantly
reduce the use of debt covenants.
22
According to Mansi, Qi, and Wald (2013), the
use of debt covenants may reflect a herding behavior, whereby the use by many firms of a particular
type or group of covenants in bond issues increases
the probability of these covenants being used
again. Accordingly, we follow Mansi et al. (2013)
and capture the herding behavior in the use of
bond covenants by controlling for the average
number of covenants included in bonds issued in
each country in the previous year. In untabulated
results, we continue to find a negative and statistically significant coefficient at the 1% level on
Trust, while the measure of the herding is statistically insignificant for our sample.
23
For example, under the chaebol ‘‘LG Group,’’
the profitable member firm, LG Securities, acquired
the unprofitable member firm LG Merchant Bank
because of the transaction’s positive effect on
controlling shareholders. As expected, this acquisition led to substantial losses for the non-controlling investors of LG Securities.

Does social trust affect international contracting?

Paul Brockman et al.

1041

24

See Beugelsdijk, Ambos, and Nell (2018) for a
discussion about measuring and operationalizing
distance constructs in the field of international
business research.
25
See Kong (2016) for additional evidence on the
relationship between generalized trust and genes,
specifically 5-HTTLPR S-allele levels.
26
In unreported results, we also use another
grammar rule suggested by Tabellini (2008), i.e.,
the license to drop pronouns, and find that our
results are qualitatively similar. In addition, using
proxies for religious affiliation as instruments for
trust yields similar findings.
27
Clustering at the firm level does not change the
results.
28
As an additional robustness test, we control for
shareholder protection using the revised anti-director rights index from Djankov et al. (2008b). The
unreported results show that the effect of social

trust on debt covenants persists when we control
for shareholder protection, which is statistically
insignificant.
29
We find similar results if we control for credit
ratings using a junk bond indicator variable or
three indicators of credit ratings for securities rated
in the A category (AA+, AA, AA-, A+, A, and A- for
S&P’s ratings; and Aa1, Aa2, Aa3, A1, A2, and A3 for
Moody’s ratings), for securities rated in the B
category (BBB+, BBB, BBB-, BB+, BB, BB-, B+, B,
and B- for S&P’s ratings; and Baa1, Baa2, Baa3, Ba1,
Ba2, Ba3, B1, B2, and B3 for Moody’s ratings), and
for securities rated in C category (CCC-, CC, and C
for S&P’s ratings; and Caa2 and Ca for Moody’s
ratings).
30
Miller and Reisel’s (2012) pricing model (which
does not consider Trust) shows that a one-standarddeviation increase in Creditor Rights leads to a 4.41
basis point reduction in Bond Spread.
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